CONSIDERING CONFLICT | NUCLEAR SAFETY Non-nuclear (thermal) power plants have been targeted.


For example, on 13 June, 2023, the Ukrainians claimed the Russians had attacked the thermal powerplant at Kryvyi Rih. Ukrainska Pravda reported: “As a result of a Russian attack on the night of 13 June, a building of a thermal power plant was damaged in Kryvyi Rih. Due to shelling, thousands of consumers in the front-line areas remain without electricity”. On 4 September, 2023, the Russians claimed that one of its thermal powerplants, located in the Bryansk region of Russia, had been subject to a Ukrainian drone attack. Britain’s Sky News reported: “Local governor Alexander Bogomaz… said there were no casualties, and the plant’s infrastructure remained unscathed”.


Nuclear safety in time of crisis or war While Bennett Ramberg’s vision of a land made sterile and uninhabitable by radionuclide contamination has not yet been realised in Ukraine, the longer hostilities last, the more opportunity there will be for mishap or, indeed, the intentional destruction of one or more of Ukraine’s fifteen nuclear reactors. The worse Russia’s prospects on the battlefield – and, by any measure, Russia’s campaign to subjugate Ukraine has failed – the greater the incentive for Russia to exploit the blackmail potential of Ukraine’s NPPs. The purpose of a nuclear power plant building


programme is to deliver security. The phenomenon of atomic blackmail, described so eloquently by Bennett Ramberg all those years ago, means that, in times of increased tension or actual war, NPP building programmes, by creating more targets, may deliver less security. This more-means-less paradox invites analysis. Any country minded to develop or grow a nuclear power


programme should, as a minimum, secure its nuclear sites against foreseeable threats. Such threats include:


● Sabotage by disaffected employees ● Terrorist attacks ● In time of crisis or war, attacks mounted by insurgents or commandos


● Shellfire, drone strikes, cruise, hypersonic or ballistic missile strikes and airstrikes.


It is important to note that even if such threats do not, in fact, translate into offensive actions – a commando raid, for example – the very possibility of their realisation may provide adversaries leverage or traction over the policies and actions of countries with NPPs. Threat influences thinking.


One of the axioms of risk management is that active


learning – the improvement of technologies and procedures based on objective analyses of past failures and successes – builds resilience and grows safety margins. It is important that current and aspirant NPP-operating countries recognise the fact that, in time of crisis or war, NPPs present adversaries with tempting targets. As the saying goes, those who fail to learn from the past risk having it repeat. As indicated by the attacks described below (Table 1), the risk is real. According to some, the past is an unreliable guide to the future. That may be the case. However, given what is at stake, countries intent on initiating or growing a nuclear power programme would be wise to study Table 1, reflect on the course of the Russia-Ukraine War and, with reference to Bennett Ramberg’s visionary discourse, hypothesise. ■


The article draws on research done for the 2023 book Atomic Blackmail? The weaponisation of nuclear facilities during the Russia-Ukraine War (Dr SA Bennett, Libri Publishing Ltd.)


Effects


Damage to a water-cooling building and a waste treatment facility


Physical damage and a number of employees killed and injured


Destruction of the facility No damage


It has been claimed that the Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom attacks caused on-site and off-site radiological contamination


According to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) the attack disabled the al-Kubar nuclear facility


Comments The French-designed Osiraq research reactor was under construction when attacked in 1980


The reactors were under construction when attacked. Iraq, which mounted several attacks on Bushehr, claimed its aircraft had attacked a petrochemicals complex


The Osiraq reactor was under construction when attacked in 1981


Iraq fired Soviet-era Scud missiles (ground-launched tactical missiles) against the facility. Iraqi Scuds were armed with conventional warheads


In light of these attacks, the United States’ condemnation of Israel’s 1981 attack on Al Tuwaitha was, in hindsight, somewhat ironic


The facility was under construction when attacked in 2007. The attack had two aims. First, to prevent Islamist terror group Daesh from using the facility to leverage concessions or acquire nuclear material (for the purpose, perhaps, of fabricating a radiological improvised explosive device or dirty bomb). Secondly, to message that Israel would never permit nuclear weapons to be acquired by states that denied Israel’s right to exist. As mentioned above, when tensions are high, messaging is important


www.neimagazine.com | October 2023 | 41


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