WASTE MANAGEMENT | SOLVING THE Pu PROBLEM
Above left: The UK’s 140 tonnes of plutonium are stored at Sellafield in Cumbria
Above right: The THORP reprocessing facility was another important part of the UK’s plutonium story
share their views and participate in a respectful,
evidence-based debate. This must be more than either a “lip service” consultation with outcomes already decided or a polarised “black versus white” argument. It needs to be an open dialogue, facilitated and led by trusted voices and based on a clear view of Government’s thinking of the role (if any) plutonium might play in meeting future UK energy needs.
● Recommendation two: The current programme of repackaging and storing the plutonium inventory in optimal conditions must be carried out by the NDA and Sellafield Ltd to the currently programmed end point of 100-year design life storage. This provides sufficient time for the necessary comprehensive Research, Development and Innovation (RD&I) required to underpin the whole plutonium lifecycle to be carried out in parallel.
● Recommendation three: Bringing the UK plutonium programme to a successful end will take several decades at least. Both Government and NDA should provide the commitment and resources needed to ensure continuity and development of capability over this timescale.
● Recommendation four: Government should decide on and implement a preferred end point for the plutonium once a satisfactory assessment of options and their attributes is available, taking into account changes in storage environment and the hazard that plutonium presents.
● Recommendation five: Given the hazard represented by the plutonium stockpile and the long duration of plutonium storage, the storage infrastructure is critical to safety and security, so Government, NDA and other stakeholders must ensure that sufficient attention and resources are devoted to long term care of these assets.
● Recommendation six: The hazard represented by the plutonium stockpile would be greatly decreased by conversion from dispersible powder into a solid form, but the choice of form will determine which future option is to be followed. Government should ensure that a comprehensive assessment is carried out on the attributes and costs of the range of options.
● Recommendation seven: The different disposition options follow very different pathways to putting plutonium beyond reach. To underpin decision-making, Government needs to develop a full understanding of the whole plutonium lifecycle for each pathway before committing to irrevocable decisions.
22 | October 2023 |
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● Recommendation eight: Because of the major uncertainties associated with the UK’s plutonium management programme, it is unwise to rely on discounted costs to evaluate the programme and, in particular the assumption of cost decrease associated with discounting should not be used as a pretext to delay decision making and action.
● Recommendation nine: The decades-long, highly challenging programme needed to address the challenges of the UK plutonium stockpile can only be delivered by an experienced community of practice so Government should ensure there is a sufficient supply of suitably qualified and experienced personnel to deliver the programme.
● Recommendation 10: Government should ensure that a robust, long-term programme of Research, Development and Innovation (RD&I) is in place to support selection and implementation of any plutonium management option.
Clearly there are tough long-term choices to make in either utilising the UK’s plutonium for nuclear fuel or disposing of it. There’s no doubt that using it could have enormous benefits as MOX fuel in conventional reactors, deployed as fuel in its own right in advanced reactor designs where it would deliver around 3,000 TWh, or in fast reactors as a way of using the vast amounts of depleted uranium too, where it could produce some 2,200,000 TWh. That’s enough to meet hundreds of years of UK energy demand. However, despite the potential benefits there are additional considerations that have to be taken into account, not least of which are the safety, security and non-proliferation concerns. Conversely, if Disposal is the final decision, several wasteforms and disposal methods would need to be assessed and there is still the requirement for a long-term geological disposal facility for the UK. However, multiple factors nonetheless weigh heavily in support of disposal at the earliest possible opportunity. Whatever the decision, the various options cannot be
kept open indefinitely. Continued storage in a powdered state perpetuates risks but converting the powder to a safer solid form would effectively remove the option to use the plutonium as fuel in the future. A decision must be made, the authors conclude that it must come from the government, and it will require a comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of each option to determine the best route for the UK. ■
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