So the next question is whether Cold War era comparisons are perhaps less helpful than a look back to the pre -World War I era? The Cold War era was a battle of ideologies, in which the western capitalist political system was pitted against Soviet communism, but also very contingent on the Pax Americana established after World War II in a western world which was deeply scarred by the living memory of that war. Leaving aside the numerous history books also show that while there were a number of crises, both sides nevertheless abided by an unspoken set of rules which pulled them back battle of political ideologies is a thing of the past, and one might observe that the living memories of the two World Wars and the Cold War also appear to be fading. Whatever one might think about Russia, and indeed China, at the current juncture, their actions in the international arena have everything to do with perceptions about their national interests, rather than a desire to propagate their political systems around the world. The battle is as such between the processes of globalization on the one hand, and national economic and security interests on the other, which was in broad terms also the hallmark of the late 19th century and the period leading up to World War I. Ironically, even perhaps ominously, it has a very strong echo in this comparison with the Panic of 1907, which turned what was a recession into a depression, and resonated around the world.
Via way of a brief aside, Russia under the Tsars was an autocracy with no constitution, and indeed no elected parliament. While it had Europe’s largest army, its economy had only belatedly started to develop an industrial and manufacturing sector in the late 19th century, with the help of some government incentives, but was far behind its peers in Western Europe. Industrialization, urbanization and the accompanying population shift was accompanied (as elsewhere) by social upheaval and disruption, and unsurprisingly demands for workers’ rights and political representation. A humiliating defeat in the 1904-1905 war with Japan on the
with a democratically elected Duma (parliament), following a run of strikes and political protests, but Tsar Nicholas II quickly reverted to brutal repression, and thus inexorably led to the revolution of 1917. Internationally, German chancellor Bismarck had been at pains to foster a very good relationship with Russia, in no small part predicated by mutual self-interest, in so far as relations with Austria- Hungary were poor, but he was dismissed by the often impetuous and bellicose Kaiser Wilhelm II, who held Russia in very low regard. Given Russia’s long held support for Serbia and the Kaiser’s support for Austria-Hungary, the diplomatically error strewn trail to World War I was set in motion.
descend into a dialogue of the deaf, where signals are misinterpreted and threats are escalated, as was the case ahead of World War I. Eminently the are a major concern, though the Ukraine could also re-emerge as one. Sadly the Ukraine represents one of the greatest failures of the EU (above all since Merkel became German Chancellor), with incessant Ukraine governments which appear to be able to excel in one area only, namely corruption, and at the same time representing perhaps the greatest provocation for Russia and Putin. Merkel above all broke with the doctrine of all her predecessors – Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt, Kohl and Schröder – that Germany’s role was to help to mediate and certainly not to dictate, above all in respect of western relations with the USSR and thereafter Russia. The personal animosity between Putin and Merkel has been well documented, and while her predecessor Schröder’s close personal relationship with Putin casts a long shadow, her other predecessors understood the value of maintaining Germany’s longstanding (stretching as far back as Peter the Great) relationship with Russia. Her seemingly deliberate failure to appreciate the sensitivity of Russia to developments in the Ukraine stands next to her inability to shift the debate in Germany on the much needed reform of the Eurozone and the EU as a major failure.
8 | ADMISI - The Ghost In The Machine | March/April 2018
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