the Syrian uprising in 2011 that morphed into the production, above all in staple agricultural crops such as wheat and barley. Indeed it had actually become a net exporter regionally, until a drought hit in 2008/09. It had as a result seen considerable public and private investment into the agricultural sector, including the in sprinkler irrigation in many of the larger state-run projects in north eastern Syria. Sadly much of this fell into the hands of the numerous anti-government forces or was located As with so many of the countries that were part of that so-called ‘Arab Spring’, rising food prices were a key contributing factor to the surge in popular unrest. This was above all no surprise in Syria, where in addition to obvious fact of the pressure on household spending that this represented at that, it is also estimated (by UN agricultural economists) that the livelihoods of some 40% of the population is in some way connected to agriculture. According to many observers, it was the marginalization of the rural, agriculture dependent population in the decade of economic liberalization up to 2011, which was a further key contributor to the uprising. It may be an obvious point, but the longer the to rebuild the agricultural infrastructure. This is all the more the case, as the war and sanctions has resulted in a re-drawing of the country’s agricultural industry, not only to overcome disruptions to supply lines.
As the Carnegie report on Syria’s agro-industry (
https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/04/ food-insecurity-in-war-torn-syria-from-decades- pub-60320) notes: “One of the unexpected breakdown in tight controls over the misuse or excessive exploitation of underground water aquifers.” “The impact of the depletion of aquifers as farmers exploit the crisis to pump water from new wells is a problem that will accentuate the country’s long-term water crisis, with a trend in declining water tables.” “Although many farmers maintain crop cultivation as much as possible despite the hostilities, the low rate of return of local produce, the shortages in fertilizers, and the high cost of fuel have all hurt productivity levels”.
In terms of Syria’s relatively small (by regional standards) energy industry, this lies largely in complete ruin. At its peak in 2002, the local oil production rate ran at 677,000 barrels per day, though the average prior to the civil war had declined to 380,000, but it now stands at just per day prior to the war, and now is less than half that level. However rebuilding its gas production infrastructure will be of rather greater importance, in so far as around 90 pct of the 8 BCm/year output prior to the civil war (now just 3.5 BCm/ year) was used for domestic electricity production; exported. While contracts, or rather co-operation agreements, have been signed with Iran and Russia for development and reconstruction of Syria’s oil and gas sector, and by extension restoring its badly damaged power grid, the cost according to IMF and other estimates has risen from ca. $25 Bln in 2015 to around $35-40 Bln currently, which given the obvious sanctions related constraints on both Russia and Iran, clearly underlines the need for other participants, as well as a far more peaceful and secure backdrop. According to some sources, the discussion between Putin and Trump in Helsinki touched on how reconstruction contracts might be divided up. Before turning attention to Iraq, it is worth mentioning that the current estimate of the cost of something akin to a Marshall Plan for Syria lies in the region of $250 Bln.
5 | ADMISI - The Ghost In The Machine | July/August 2018
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