SECURITY
The very technologies that hospitals use to meet the challenges of an ageing population and Net Zero commitments are simultaneously expanding their attack surface.
The incident makes national news, eroding public confidence in the hospital’s ability to provide safe care. Temperature control failures pose direct clinical risks, particularly for vulnerable populations. Hospitals have limited backup options for HVAC. You cannot simply wheel in portable air conditioning for an entire ward of critically ill patients. Attack vectors are not limited to temperature. Research has demonstrated clear links between faulty HVAC systems and infectious disease outbreaks.
n Scenario two: ransomware via the energy network
Attackers identify that a hospital’s energy management platform connects to the broader IT network without adequate segmentation. They deploy ransomware that spreads from the BMS into other systems. The attack encrypts not only patient records but also the hospital’s ability to monitor and control critical infrastructure. Backup generators fail to activate properly because the control
systems that manage them are locked. The hospital faces an impossible choice: pay a substantial ransom or operate with severely degraded capacity for days or weeks while systems are rebuilt. The economic impact would be severe. According to ABB research,
every minute of hospital power outage can cost upwards of £6,000. A multi-day degradation would run into millions. But the human cost could be far higher: cancelled surgeries, delayed treatments, ambulance diversions, and the potential for serious harm.
One system, ringfenced networks The solution to these risks is not to abandon smart energy management. Hospitals must adopt a ‘secure by design’ approach that builds cybersecurity into energy infrastructure from the outset. This requires action across multiple layers. Network segmentation and data isolation form the foundation of any
robust defence. Energy management data streams must be isolated from sensitive intranets containing patient records and clinical systems. This means implementing properly configured firewalls between operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT), using Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) to create logical separation within physical networks, and carefully controlling data flows between zones.
If an energy management system is compromised, the breach should
not provide a pathway into clinical systems. Conversely, if patient data systems are attacked, energy infrastructure should remain protected. Secure communication protocols and encryption ensure that data moving between sensors, controllers, and management platforms cannot be easily intercepted or manipulated. Modern protocols like KNX Data Secure use encryption and authentication to protect valuable operational data. When evaluating or upgrading energy management systems,
hospitals should prioritise solutions that support contemporary security protocols. ABB’s i-bus KNX platform, for instance, incorporates KNX Data Secure encryption across building automation components, defending against data interception and manipulation. This should be considered essential for any new deployment.
April 2026 Health Estate Journal 59
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