FIRE ONBOARD ‘BBC XINGANG’ STRESSES HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH HOT WORK


The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has published its investigation report on the fire onboard the general cargo ship ‘BBC Xingang’, while berthed at Mayfield number four berth in Newcastle, New South Wales, in December 2017. The incident highlights that, prior to hot work, cargo coverings should be carefully assessed and adequate protection against damage or fire due to hot material should be provided.


The work commenced in the number two cargo hold tween deck. Gaps between the tween deck pontoons were filled with fire blankets (made from woven fibre and leather) to stop sparks from falling onto the cloth-covered cargo in the lower hold. A small diameter fresh water hose was laid out and a makeshift water spray extinguisher readied for immediate use in the lower hold. Cargo in the lower hold was covered with the transport cloth, but was not covered with fire blankets.


At 1015, the boilermaker began removing the stoppers. The port captain asked that sparks be directed away from the cargo to protect the component surfaces. This request, in some cases, resulted in the sparks being directed toward gaps between the tween deck pontoons.


The work continued as expected and, at 1100, the boilermaker stopped to relocate to the next stoppers on the tween deck. As part of checking the new work area, he lifted a fire blanket and could see small flames and smoke in the lower hold through the gap in the tween deck pontoons. He immediately raised the alarm. The lower hold fire watch was notified on the radio. At the time he was notified, he was not near the area directly under where the work was being conducted. After moving to the relevant area, he quickly extinguished the fire using the water hose and water spray.


An inspection of the work site following the fire identified that molten metal and other hot material produced by the hot work had burned through the fire blankets. This hot material fell onto the material covering the cargo in the lower hold, resulting in the fire. As a result of the fire, the material covering the cargo was damaged and some surface blemishes were apparent on the cargo itself. No other damage was reported. Subsequent inspection of the cargo covering material found it to be 100% polyester transport cloth with a maximum rated temperature of 200 °C.


Full details, findings and lessons learnt: https://bit.ly/2umziYv


A CULTURE OF POOR MAINTENANCE PRACTICES LED TO CARIBBEAN FANTASY FIRE SAYS REPORT


A poor safety culture and the ineffective implementation of a safety management system were identified as the most likely causes of the 2016 fire aboard the RoRo vessel Caribbean Fantasy.


The vessel’s main engine room was hit by fire in the morning hours of 17 August 2016, when fuel spraying from a leaking flange came in contact with a hot surface on the port main propulsion engine, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said in a report.


NTSB has reported that poor maintenance practices led to an uncontained fuel spray from a blank flange at the end of the port main engine fuel supply line onto the hot exhaust manifold of the engine.


Contributing to the rapid spread of the fire were fuel and lube oil quick closing valves that were intentionally blocked open, fixed firefighting systems that were ineffective and a structural fire boundary that failed.


Contributing to the fire and the prolonged abandonment effort was the failure of the Panama Maritime Authority and the recognized organization, RINA Services, to ensure Baja Ferries’ safety management system was functional.


Full story: https://bit.ly/2mmdoA2


The Report • September 2018 • Issue 85 | 15


Safety Briefings


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