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Perhaps just as important is having ships where it matters, operating forward, such as Spain inviting us to forward deploy four ships and, in Japan, increasing U.S. presence by two destroyers. There will be another submarine in Guam and four littoral combat ships forward [in the Pacific] to where we rotate crews. In Bahrain, it means migrating from minesweepers and patrol craft, which will retire early in the next decade, to littoral combat ships and an afloat forward staging base. There’s metamorphosis forward of new ship types — joint high-speed vessel, mobile landing platform, afloat forward staging base, and littoral combat ship, along with delivery of ships now under construction, continuing the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and two submarines a year.
So even under sequestration again in 2016 you would be able to reach ship strength totals.
No, with sequestration we would not. We would get close to 300 ships, and then it would decay. We would have to cancel ships, with the two biggest concerns our small and large surface combatants. A ship I don’t build in 2016 is the ship that doesn’t deliver in 2021.
Rep. Adam Smith, top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, said the Navy is in danger of going down to eight carriers. Is that a possibility?
It is. The scenario would start with not having enough money to overhaul George Washington and [would] continue down from there. The next one to need overhauling is USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74). Is there money? If not, we’re down to nine, and if you don’t build a new carrier, we’re down to eight. That scenario is not even in our alternative budget. But if you extrapolate out a decade under the BCA and we have to balance capabilities, everything is on the table.
How many carriers do you have and need in the Pacific?
Navy Adm. [Samuel P.] Locklear [U.S. Pacific commander] says he needs at least two carriers — what he frequently calls 2.2 to 2.3 — in the interest of having one on station and one on its way over or on its way back. What we have been able to provide is one.
It’s a matter of how much influence you want and how quickly you can respond. If we have a contingency and need to surge, how many carriers are ready to gather the air wing and ships and go out? Normally I have two deployed. My covenant with my combatant commands is to have two carrier strike groups and two readiness amphibious groups deployed, and, in about 30 days, I could bring three more. Today, because of the impact of sequestration and our reduced budget, I have one of each ready to respond within about 30 days.
And that’s why sailors must be deployed months longer?
Due to sequestration and slowdown in maintenance and training, we’re at eight-and-a-half-month deployments, on average. We are trying to recover from that impact from sequestration last year. Hopefully, by next year, we will.
Was your sea pay initiative a response to this greater burden? Would it have happened if deployments had not gotten longer?
I think it would have. We wanted to make sea duty the center of gravity in the Navy. So we studied sea pay and said, “Not adequate.”
I believe we also need to acknowledge the hardship of extended deployments. Congress authorized a high deployment allowance before 9/11. Members who went over a threshold of 190 days would have to be paid extra for every day after that. There also was a collective number of 420 days deployed out of every 720 days. That was waived when 9/11 occurred, and the allowance never was paid. To begin, we had to have an accurate accounting of every member in high-deployment status. [CONTINUES ON PAGE 70]