“It is to be hoped that the new constitution has whetted an appetite for change, change rooted in some overarching vision of social and political advancement.”
institution of the office of Director of Public Prosecution relieves the Attorney General of this role which was a violation of the theory of the separation of powers. Other changes which address governmental transparency and attention to civic rights include the introduction of a Complaint Commissioner to protect citizens and an Electoral Commissioner independent of political control. The establishment de jure of the position of the Leader of the Opposition enhances the quality of parliamentary democracy. A “belonger” (local citizen) Deputy Governor enhances the idea of self-government; and a preamble stamps a sense of ownership on the constitution and imparts an element of cultural relevance. Some of the most obvious
is to soften the absolutist ring of the Governor’s power without significantly altering it in reality. This is the effect of mandating the Governor to keep the Premier “fully informed” of the general conduct of matters over which he has discretionary power. Those powers are not thereby altered or shared. The new constitution brought
other useful changes. A National Advisory Committee (NAC) offers some opportunity for power-
sharing. It consists essentially of Parliamentarians including a Member of the opposition. It is however stipulated that the Governor is not obliged to act on the recommendation of the Council. So much of the efforts at modernization smacks of giving with one hand and taking with the other. The limiting provisos ensure this.
A Mercy Committee operates
similarly to the (NAC) as far as power-sharing is concerned. The
changes deal with nomenclature. There is a Legislative Assembly rather than a Council; a cabinet instead of an Executive Council and a Premier instead of a Chief Minister. These give the constitution a more modern ring and a more democratic face; but in reality, they are partly cosmetic and not all systemic. For instance, the Premier is not the same position as that given to the islands which gained statehood in association with Britain under the 1967 West Indies Act; and the cabinet falls short of the Bermuda pattern where the Premier presides and not just in the absence of the Governor. The government sees the
constitution as an evolving work; but it is still necessary to ensure that many of the changes are not in part mere sweeteners to disguise the pill of enduring gubernatorial authority.
Only a first step The extent of modernization attained by the constitution is not as great as the language in which it is couched suggests. This is reflected in the contingency power of the Governor and the democratic deficit. We have already alluded to
dissatisfaction with the constitution in some quarters. The section on fundamental rights and freedom is savagely criticized by both lawyers and lay persons. Terms such as “anti- democratic”, “absolute power concentrated in a person”, “draconian and dictatorial power” and “arbitrary and one-man rule” are used, admittedly with some exaggeration. In too many cases, though, the Governor is subject to the oversight of a distant eye in the person of the U.K. Secretary of State; and that infamous phrase “not to be inquired into by any court of law” which exempts the Governor from legal scrutiny, has been condemned as anti- democratic. There have been useful
changes to the constitution, but it has not really been modernized, if that term connotes meaningful power-sharing. A sensible Governor can wield his/her power lightly and involve the Premier more integrally in governance. The constitution allows him/her to. It is to be hoped that the new constitution has whetted an appetite for change, change rooted in some overarching vision of social and political advancement. What would be tragic is for such
changes as have occurred to induce complacency in a people who have supposedly arrived. Radical constitutional reform is still a future prospect.