Expenses — continued from Page 20


The liens arise whenever sums paid


to the beneficiary of either program are recovered in litigation. For benefits paid to a decedent in a wrongful-death case, Fitch v. Select Products (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 591], stands for the proposition that, unless the benefits paid to the decedent are recovered by the plaintiffs as successors in interest, they are not recoverable by the state. Federal liens are extinguished under the same circum- stances, and the extent of the lien may be reduced in accordance with the guide- lines set out in the U.S. Supreme Court case, specifically referenced in Welfare & Institutions Code section 14124.70. Until resolution of Olsen v. Reid,


Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions (review granted); and King v. Willmett,


(rev. granted), all of which are now before the State Supreme Court, it would appear that Cabrera v. E. Rojas Properties, and Hanif and Nishihama compel the con- clusion that, if the MediCal or MediCare benefits have been paid on behalf of the plaintiff, and no other payments by anyone have been made, the plaintiff is only enti- tled to recover the amounts paid, unless he remains liable for the balance of the billing. Since MediCal and MediCare typically pay only a fraction of the bill, that significantly limits the amount of the past medical expense which can be introduced. As a practical matter, such minuscule


payments signal to the jury that the pay- ments have been made by a governmental entity to an indigent plaintiff, even if the


source is never disclosed. In that instance, the jury may resent finding for the plain- tiff and awarding the money, unless they are clearly told that the money must, and will be repaid to the government. Skillfully handled and artfully argued, the jury can then conclude that their own best interests lie in awarding a sum of money to the plaintiff for reimbursement to the program their tax dollars are used to support. While the collateral-source rule is no


longer of use in medical-malpractice claims, the principle behind it is still of some value. Jurors are still motivated by a need to feel that an award of damages to a medical malpractice victim will fix some- thing, or compensate for some loss, as described by David Ball. And, they will not


berman@berbay.com


www.berbay.com 22— The Advocate Magazine JULY 2011


berman@berbay.com


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