POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR POLICY REFORM 199
employees, the government, and the SEB. The agreement addressed the interests of the electricity-sector employees by protecting their job security, salaries, and benefits. This agreement alone does not, however, explain why the power-sector reform in Andhra Pradesh was possible. The reform also affected groups that were not represented at the negotiation table, such as the industrialists and households benefiting from power theft. Hence, strong leadership as well as strategic bargaining was necessary. Strategic bargaining could also be used to induce the fertilizer industry to support policy reform. A credible bargain with the fertilizer industry could be promoted if the government showed a more united face to the industry and, in its own communications, separated the issue of food security from self- sufficiency in fertilizer production. The industry is made up of a small num- ber of actors with very specific material interests: if it is convinced that the government is serious about reform and is even willing to consider a larger dependence on imports, the industry will likely be prepared to negotiate. A bargaining approach appears less applicable to the farmgate price of fertilizer and tariffs and metering for agricultural electricity. Unlike the fertilizer and electricity producers, farmers are a large and heterogeneous group. Moreover, farmers’ organizations do not represent the farmers in the same way that labor unions represent the employees, because the farmers’ organizations are fragmented and not all of them have registered members. Moreover, unlike the electricity employees, the farmers are not in a contrac- tual relationship with the state: hence any deal would require considerable trust on the part of the farmers. Another approach for the government would be to negotiate with members of Parliament over fertilizer reforms or mem- bers of the state legislative assemblies over electricity reforms. It is not clear whether the farmer’s organizations would be willing to negotiate over either fertilizer or electricity pricing. According to the theory of strategic bargaining, participants typically first consider their “best alterna- tive to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) (Fisher and Ury 1983). For the utility employees in Andhra Pradesh, the incentives to arrive at a negotiated solution were high, as there was a “credible threat” that the government would pursue the reforms in any case. Creating a credible threat regarding fertilizer pricing and electricity pricing and metering appears more difficult. To overcome the challenges of negotiated approaches, it may be useful to think about the subsidy reform more broadly and ask the question: What should be done with the public resources that will be saved if the subsidies to agriculture are reduced? One concern, which features especially in the welfare-state-oriented discourse, is that after reducing subsidies to agricul- ture, these resources might be spent in ways that are far less desirable from an equity perspective. The market-oriented discourse argues that subsidies crowd out public investment, but there is no guarantee that the reduction
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124 |
Page 125 |
Page 126 |
Page 127 |
Page 128 |
Page 129 |
Page 130 |
Page 131 |
Page 132 |
Page 133 |
Page 134 |
Page 135 |
Page 136 |
Page 137 |
Page 138 |
Page 139 |
Page 140 |
Page 141 |
Page 142 |
Page 143 |
Page 144 |
Page 145 |
Page 146 |
Page 147 |
Page 148 |
Page 149 |
Page 150 |
Page 151 |
Page 152 |
Page 153 |
Page 154 |
Page 155 |
Page 156 |
Page 157 |
Page 158 |
Page 159 |
Page 160 |
Page 161 |
Page 162 |
Page 163 |
Page 164 |
Page 165 |
Page 166 |
Page 167 |
Page 168 |
Page 169 |
Page 170 |
Page 171 |
Page 172 |
Page 173 |
Page 174 |
Page 175 |
Page 176 |
Page 177 |
Page 178 |
Page 179 |
Page 180 |
Page 181 |
Page 182 |
Page 183 |
Page 184 |
Page 185 |
Page 186 |
Page 187 |
Page 188 |
Page 189 |
Page 190 |
Page 191 |
Page 192 |
Page 193 |
Page 194 |
Page 195 |
Page 196 |
Page 197 |
Page 198 |
Page 199 |
Page 200 |
Page 201 |
Page 202 |
Page 203 |
Page 204 |
Page 205 |
Page 206 |
Page 207 |
Page 208 |
Page 209 |
Page 210 |
Page 211 |
Page 212 |
Page 213 |
Page 214 |
Page 215 |
Page 216 |
Page 217 |
Page 218 |
Page 219 |
Page 220 |
Page 221 |
Page 222 |
Page 223 |
Page 224 |
Page 225 |
Page 226 |
Page 227 |
Page 228 |
Page 229 |
Page 230 |
Page 231 |
Page 232 |
Page 233 |
Page 234 |
Page 235 |
Page 236 |
Page 237 |
Page 238 |
Page 239 |
Page 240 |
Page 241 |
Page 242 |
Page 243 |
Page 244 |
Page 245 |
Page 246 |
Page 247 |
Page 248 |
Page 249 |
Page 250 |
Page 251 |
Page 252 |
Page 253 |
Page 254 |
Page 255 |
Page 256 |
Page 257 |
Page 258 |
Page 259 |
Page 260 |
Page 261