The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy Reform in India

POLITICS OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY TO AGRICULTURE 151

a high level of efficiency within the public sector framework. Besides, even if these standards are achieved through exceptional efforts, they would be very difficult to maintain and the system could easily deteriorate again” (NCAER 2003, 33–34).

In the story line of the market-oriented discourse, the telecommunica- tions sector is often invoked to make the case for privatization. In the words of the representative of the Liberal Farmers’ Movement: “In 1980, when we started our farmer’s movement, I recall the journalists after a particular event would rush to the post office and book what is called lightning calls to call from Nasik to Delhi or to Mumbai. That was supposed to be the highest priority call, and that would take about three hours to materialize. Now we find that after the liberalization, after the government took its hands out, India leads in mobile services. India leads in cell phones. And anybody is able to phone anybody at any time.”35

The welfare-state-oriented discourse presents two major arguments against privatization. One argument holds that privatization efforts in India have not met expectations. The cases of Orissa (“the Orissa model”) and Delhi are frequently cited as examples.36 The other major argument holds that privatization serves the interests of multinational companies who do not care about the needs of the people, especially the poor.37 Asked about his view on privatization, a representative of the Punjab Electrical Engineers’ Association responded: “We are formally opposing this move. It is a very dan- gerous move. It has proved failure wherever applied, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, even Delhi itself. They have not recruited. They have gained the profit. They have not added anything to the system. They are not catering to the needs of the people. They are earning profits. They have not reduced the losses. They promised that we will reduce the losses. But it is not so. 83 per- cent losses in Delhi, 24 percent in Punjab, much less in cities like Ludhiana, which has 15 percent losses.” Similarly, an academic commented: “I have lived through the Delhi privatization, and I can tell you that paying more does not ensure that we get better service. I mean, any resident of Delhi can tell you.”38 Likewise, in the view of the CPI-M, privatization is “a recipe for

35 Interview with representative of the Liberal Farmers’ Movement, January 10, 2006. 36 Starting in 1993, Orissa was the first state that engaged in far-reaching power sector reform

with the aim of privatizations (see Chapter 3). The reform process in Delhi started with a strategy paper in 1997 and led to privatization in 2002. Both cases have been criticized for not realizing the expected gains in terms of improved power sector performance (Dubash and Rajan

2001; Ruet 2005). 37 The academic literature provides evidence that the reform in Orissa was in fact associated with a neglect of rural electrification and considerable decline in the electricity consumption of

poor households (Sihag, Misra, and Sharma 2004, 61). 38 Interview with academic, New Delhi, April 13, 2004.

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