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arises on or after October 1, 1994, an award for noneconomic damages may not exceed $500,000. (ii) Te limitation on noneconomic damages provided under subparagraph (i) of this paragraph shall increase by $15,000 on October 1 of each year beginning on October 1, 1995. Te increased amount shall apply to causes of action arising between October 1 of that year and September 30 of the following year, inclusive.
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(3)(i) Te limitation established under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall apply in a personal injury action to each direct victim of tortious conduct and all persons who claim injury by or through that victim. (Emphasis added.)
Te Plaintiff asserted that under the plain language of
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Plaintiff also argued that the Cap was an unconstitutional “Special Law” prohibited by the Maryland Constitution. In the alternative, Te Plaintiff argued that, even if the Cap is constitutional and does apply to Consumer Protection Act claims, the trial court erred because it applied the incorrect Cap -- $510,000 instead of $530,000. Te Court of Special Appeals affirmed and the Court of Appeals granted the Plaintiff ’s Petition for Certiorari.
Application of the Cap Te Plaintiff ’s two-pronged argument that the Cap does
not apply to claims brought pursuant to the CPA was based on the plain language of the Cap statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2)(i) "Noneconomic damages" means:
1. In an action for personal injury, pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary injury; and
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(b)(1) In any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986, an award for noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000. (2)(i) Except as provided in paragraph (3)(ii) of
this subsection, in any action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death in which the cause of action
24 Trial Reporter / Winter 2010
Section 3(i), in order for the Cap to apply, two conditions precedent must be satisfied: first, there must be a “personal injury action” and second, there must be a victim of “tortious” conduct. With regard to the Plaintiff ’s claim under the CPA, the Plaintiff argued that neither of the prerequisites had been satisfied because claims brought pursuant to the CPA are neither personal injury actions nor torts. Te Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the Court
of Special Appeals. In so doing, the Court held that a cause of action for injuries caused by a violation of the CPA is a “personal injury action” and that such actions are “in the nature of a tort” and therefore constitute “tortious” conduct.
Is the Cap a Prohibited Special Law? In addition to asserting the non-applicability of the cap
to CPA claims, the Plaintiff also argued that the Cap violates Maryland’s prohibition on “special laws,” as delineated in Section 33 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution. In Prince George's Co. v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 113 Md. 179, 77 A. 433 (1910), the Court of Appeals stated that “[a] special law is one that relates to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law which applies to all persons or things of a class.” Id. at 183, 77 A. at 434. Te Plaintiff ’s argument that the Cap is a prohibited “special law” was based on the premise that the Cap, involves a burden on particular class members. Te Plaintiff argued that, while on its face the Cap applies to all injured persons who receive awards of damages from juries, in effect, it burdens only the most severely injured, those who receive larger awards. Te Court of Appeals rejected this argument as well, holding that because the Cap applies to “all” personal injury claims, it is a “general law” and therefore constitutional. Te Court did not explain why it rejected the Plaintiff ’s argument that while on its face the Cap appears to apply to all actions, in practice it only prevents the most severely injured victims of tortious conduct from receiving the compensation determined to be appropriate by a jury.
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