Appellate Decisions (Continued from page 44)
they married the couple could not have known that Mr. Gianotti would later de- velop mesothelioma. Mr. Gianotti died shortly after trial but before a final judg- ment was entered in the matter. The jury awarded 5.5 million dollars in damages to Mr. Gianotti and one million dollars to the couple jointly for loss of consor- tium. Those amounts were reduced by the pro rata releases of adjudicated joint tort- feasors and by a default judgment against Babcock & Wilcox, a third party defen- dant. The lower court ultimately entered judgment in favor of the Mr. Gianotti for $1.050, 499.71, and Mr. and Mrs. Gianotti, jointly, for $175,653.74. On appeal, Owens-Illinois argued that the cap on non-economic damages should apply to Mr. Gianotti’s claim because his injury did not “arise” – for purposes of the cap statue – before July 1, 1986. Owens-Illinois further contended that the trial judge erred by failing to grant the defendant’s motion for mistrial after the Gianotti’s attorney improperly mentioned the cap on non-economic damages dur- ing his closing argument. Further, Owens contended that a prior settlement between the two parties barred recovery for the current injury; and lastly, Owens-Illinois claimed that the loss of consortium award was improper because the injury occurred prior to the parties’ marriage and under the common law, there could be no re- covery for loss of consortium when the injury (upon on which the parties predi- cated the loss of consortium claim) occurred before the marriage. On a cross appeal, plaintiffs’ counsel contended that the trial judge erred by finding that there had been a settlement between the Gianottis’ and a joint tort- feasor, Babcock and Wilcox, which pursuant to the UCATA proportionally reduced the amount of the award.
Held: The cap on non-economic damages did not apply because the last date of as- bestos exposure by Mrs. Gianotti was before July 1, 1986. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for mistrial because his finding that the defendants suffered no prejudice has a rational basis and because Owens- Illinois had failed to establish that a mistrial was “manifestly necessary.” Fur- ther, that the language of the earlier releases did not preclude recovery for the
mesothelioma claim. Lastly, the Court held that the loss of consortium award was proper because at the time the couple married, the latent disease have not been discovered nor could it have been reason- ably discoverable. Therefore, the justification for the common-law rule that prohibited a spouse from claiming loss of consortment for injuries sustained by the other spouse prior to marriage – that a person should not be able to marry into a cause of action – lacked logical force when the disease was not reasonably discover- able at the time of marriage. The Court also held that because the
Gianottis’ option to reject the settlement was time limited and no rejection oc- curred within the allotted period, their claim had been settled against Babcock and Wilcox.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., et al. v. v. Harry Cook, Sr., et al., No. 2644, Sept. Term, 2000, filed October 30, 2002. Opinion by Salmon, J.
______ Court of Appeals
TORTS – DUTY OF A COMMON CARRIER TO TAKE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO RENDER AID TO A PASSENGER UNDER ATTACK
Kenneth Todd v. Mass Transit Administra- tion, No. 61, September Term, 2002, filed February 14, 2003. Opinion by Battaglia, J.
______ Court of Special Appeals
TORTS – QUALIFIED IMMUNITY – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – CON- STITUTIONAL TORT – “SECOND STOP” – GOVERNMENTAL IMMU- NITY
Facts: Keith A. Lee sued Fredrick County Deputy Sheriff Gary Cline for violating his constitutional rights during a traffic stop. Cline stopped Lee for a missing li- cense plate. Lee produced his missing plate. Cline asked Lee for permission to search his car for narcotics and weapons. Lee refused, stating that Cline did not have any reason to suspect he was trans- porting any illegal items. Cline requested a canine unit. The canine did not alert.
Lee claimed he was subjected to racial profiling and retaliation for refusing con- sent to search. He sued Cline for unjustifiably detaining him longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop. On summary judgment, the circuit court ruled that there was no violation of the motorist’s constitutional rights, the officer had qualified immunity, and the motorist did not overcome the officer’s qualified immunity.
Held: Affirmed. The circuit court erred in concluding there was no evidence of an unjustified detention or “second stop.” The evidentiary record showed that the length of the stop and whether the officer improperly detained appellant longer than was necessary rested on factual disputes that could not properly be resolved on summary judgment. But the summary judgment was proper in this case because, (1) under section 5-522 (b) of the Mary- land Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), codified at Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 5-552 (b) of the Courts & Judi- cial Proceedings Article, Cline was classified as a State personnel who could assert a statutory qualified immunity de- fense against both Lee’s constitutional tort claims and his intentional tort claims; and (2) Lee did not present sufficient evidence of malice to defeat summary judgment. Unlike local government employees, whose common law public official immu- nity was not expanded by a Local Government Tort Claims Act, State per- sonnel were granted a statutory qualified immunity when the legislature partially waived the State’s absolute sovereign im- munity as part of the MTCA. In Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 374-74 n.14 (1991), the Court of Appeals recognized that section 5-522 (b) gave State person- nel a statutory qualified immunity against State constitutional torts. Although the Court’s subsequent opinion in Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 201 (2000), con- tains dicta stating that state personnel are “not entitled to qualified immunity” against state constitutional tort claims, Ritchie provides the correct interpretation of section 5-522 (b) as a statutory grant of qualified immunity to State personnel for all types of tort claims.
Lee v Cline, No. 2275, September Term, 2001, filed December 26, 2002. Opinion by Adkins, J.
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