George’s County, defendants immediately moved to dismiss all remaining claims on collateral estoppel grounds. They asserted that the federal court had granted summary judg- ment, and had mad factual findings of probable cause, lack of malice, and qualified immunity under federal law that pre- cluded a finding of malice under Maryland law. The Honorable Sherrie Krauser declined to give the federal order any preclusive effect, and denied the motion. After discov- ery, defendants filed a summary judgment motion, asserting that there was insufficient evidence of malice to overcome the municipal defendants’ qualified immunity und CJ 5-507. At the motions hearing and in a subsequent written opinion, the circuit court granted the motion.
Held: Reversed as to five of the eight counts against the ar- resting officers and the city; affirmed in all other respects. The circuit court correctly declined to give the federal
court’s dismissal on qualified immunity grounds and the fed- eral court’s statement regarding probable cause any preclusive effect.
The substantive distinction drawn by the Court of
Appeals in Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143 (1999), be- tween the “subjective malice” that defeats qualified immunity under Maryland’s Tort Claims Act and the “objective malice” that defeats qualified immunity under federal law governing Section 1983, applies to qualified immunity claims by mu- nicipal officials under CJ § 5-507. Thus, the issue of qualified immunity under federal law was not “identical” to the issue of qualified immunity under Maryland law, and the federal court’s dismissal on qualified immunity grounds did not col- laterally estop plaintiffs from litigating whether defendants acted with malice or were entitled to qualified immunity un- der CJ § 5-507. The federal court’s statement regarding existence of probable cause to arrest was not an “actually de- termined,” “essential,” or “fully litigated” finding of fact entitled to collateral estoppel effect. The circuit court erred in finding there was insufficient evidence of malice against the arresting officer. Under sum- mary judgment standards recently emphasized by the Court of Appeals, summary judgment is generally not appropriate in qualified immunity cases involving a determination of whether the arresting officer acted with malice. In this case, the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the arresting officer and the city, as his employer, because “sub- jective malice” could be inferred from (1) evidence that the arresting officer had a racial animus for the arrest based on a perception that the arrestee was racially prejudiced and com- mitted racially discriminatory acts; (2) evidence that the arresting officer had a financial animus for the arrest based arrestee’s refusal to hire off-duty police officers, including ar- resting officer; or (3) evidence of a history of animosity between the arrestee and the arresting officer.
Robert Lee Thacker, et al. v. City of Hyattsville, et al., No. 2131, Sept. Term 1999, filed Sept. 8, 2000. Opinion by Adkins, J.
Workers’ Compensation Law
Permanent Total Disability - A claimant’s maximum amount of permanent total disability compensation is determined by the applicable statute in effect on the date of the com- pensable accidental injury.
Waters v. Pleasant Manor Nursing Home, No. 104, September Term, 1999, filed October 10, 2000. Opinion by Harrell, J.
Winter 2001
Trial Reporter
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