Federal Preemption:


Geier and Its Implications by Nicole Schultheis and Simon Walton


Nicole Schultheis is a member of MTLA’s Board of Governors and is the Immediate Past President of The TLPJ Foundation. She is a member of MTLA’s President’s Club as a Supporter and serves as an ATLA State Delegate.


Simon Walton Chairs MTLA’s Public Interest/Pro Bono Committee, is State Coordinator for The TLPJ Foundation and serves on its Board of Directors. He is a member of MTLA’s President’s Club as a Supporter.


On May 22, 2000, the United States


Supreme Court issued its most recent de- cision on federal preemption of state common law claims: Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.1


The Court


unanimously agreed that the federal stat- ute at issue in the case – the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 – does not expressly preempt any common law claims. By a single vote, however, in a ruling the dissent called an “unprecedented extension of the doctrine of pre-emption,” five members of the Court found implied preemption of some “no-airbag” claims.2 The purpose of this article is to pro-


vide an overview of the Geier decision’s implications – good and bad – for other cases.


The implications are significant, not only for other airbag and auto design defect cases, but also for cases involving all sorts of products nationwide. The Geier case was argued for appel-


lants by Arthur Bryant, Executive Director of the national public interest law firm Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, or TLPJ. The work of TLPJ is not profit oriented but is supported by The TLPJ Foundation, whose members contribute not just their dues but also their time and talents to help preserve access to the courts. TLPJ provides an important re- source for any plaintiff’s attorney faced with a federal preemption defense. As part of its Federal Preemption


Project, TLPJ and its member attorneys throughout the country have been brief- ing and arguing preemption issues in federal and state courts for over fifteen years. TLPJ also represented plaintiffs before the Supreme Court in Freightliner, Inc. v. Myrick, in which the Court unani- mously rejected preemption of certain truck “no-anti-lock brake” claims.3


TLPJ 4 1 2 3


Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).


For the dissent’s language, see Geier, 120 S.Ct. At 1928.


Freightliner, Inc. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).


16


You can contact TLPJ at its National Head- quarters, 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20036, 202-797-8600, fax 202-232-7203, or its West Coast office, One Kaiser Plaza, Suite 275, Oakland, CA 94612, (510)622-8150, fax (510) 622-8155.


Trial Reporter


routinely monitors preemption develop- ments, has information packages and cop- ies of key briefs and decisions available, and is dedicated to preserving injury vic- tims’ day in court. Depending on the case, TLPJ might even be willing to file an amicus brief or, as in Geier and Freightliner, actually take on the preemption challenge ourselves. TLPJ will help however it can, so please make contact.4


Geier and Preemption Basics Geier is the latest in a series of cases


the Supreme Court has been issuing re- cently on whether various federal statutes and/or federal regulations preempt state common law claims for damages. What is happening in these cases (most of which involve personal injuries) is that the de- fendant is arguing that it cannot be sued because – no matter how outrageously it may have acted – it complied with some federal law and that federal law preempts the state laws that injury victims use to sue wrongdoers for causing their injuries. Over the past twenty years, scores of de- fendants – from nuclear power companies to tobacco companies to auto manufac- turers and others – have been trying to use and expand this “federal preemption defense” to avoid accountability for their conduct. And, far too often, as in Geier, they have found judges (or Justices) will- ing to rule in their favor. The facts in Geier were fairly straight-


forward. The case arose in January 1992, when the 1978 Honda Accord driven by Alexis Geier crashed. Geier was wearing her seatbelt and shoulder harness, but – because the car did not have an airbag – her face smashed into the steering wheel. She has already needed 14 separate facial reconstruction surgeries. She and her fam-


ily sued Honda, alleging that she would have walked away from the crash if the car had contained a driver’s side airbag. Honda argued that it was immune from suit because the Geiers’ “no-airbag” claim was preempted by federal law. Under established law, Congressional intent to preempt a state law can be found in two basic ways. First, there is express preemption: Congress can explicitly state its intent to preempt the state law at is- sue. Second, if Congress has not plainly stated its intent with regard to preemp- tion, an intention to preempt can be implied.


Implied preemption can be


found when (a)␣ the federal legislation is so comprehensive that it leaves no room for the states to supplement federal law, (b) compliance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility or (c) the state law conflicts with the federal law because it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress.” In Geier, Honda urged the Court to find both express pre- emption and the last type of implied preemption listed above.


Express Preemption Honda’s express preemption argument was based on the preemption provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which states: “When- ever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard... is in effect, no State or politi- cal subdivision of a State shall ... establish or continue in effect ... any safety stan- dard applicable to the same aspect of performance ... which is not identical to the Federal standard.”5


Honda said that,


since Federal motor vehicle safety stan- dard 208 applies to occupant crash protection and allowed it to manufacture cars without airbags in 1988, any com- mon law claim holding it liable for making


(Continued on page 18) 5


15 U.S.C. §1392(d) (1988 ed.), recodified at 49 U.S.C. §30103(b) (1994 ed.).


Winter 2001


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