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we didn’t use a lot of mainline troops to expand that to the maximum de- gree. There was still a very conven- tional mindset of maneuver warfare and how that needed to be con- ducted. And I think the terrain was extremely difficult for us to operate in, as opposed to Iraq, which had a highly developed road system.” Thiel spent considerable time in

Iraq and saw firsthand how success- ful a population-centric counterin- surgency can be when implemented correctly. “We had our whole force, basically, trying to connect with the population and win them over,” he says. “You had that at the tactical level, and you saw it advance all the way up to the strategic level when we cut a deal with the Sunnis for the Sunni awakening. In the Sunni areas of Iraq, that helped turn the tide of the insurgency.”

Lessons from the USSR The Soviet Union learned the hard way the importance of a population- centric approach during its occupa- tion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, says Boot. Rather than try to win over the populace with humanitarian support, the Russian invaders were brutal in their approach, routinely killing civil- ians, looting property, and desecrating mosques. This gave rise to a motivated mujahideen guerrilla army (covertly supported by the U.S.) that viciously harassed the Red Army at every turn. After nine years of futile fighting with little to show for it, the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989. The U.S. faced a similar situation

after it invaded Afghanistan and Iraq following the 9/11 terrorist attack. Unable to take on the well-armed occupying force face-to-face, local insurgents turned to guerrilla tactics, including the widespread use of IEDs. “There was a bit of a learning

curve,” Thiel says about the early days 84 MILITARY OFFICER JANUARY 2015

of OEF/OIF. Things began to change, he says, once American forces started earning the trust of the local populace. “We tried to throw materiel at the problem, and in the end what really helped us in Iraq and Afghanistan were social networks and understand- ing social dynamics,” Thiel observes. “Both conflicts have reinforced that you have to connect to the society on the local level. And you have to con- nect our people to their people and show value. You have to empower them for their own security.”

Evaluating new enemies But not all insurgencies can be con- tained that way, as evidenced by the fight against ISIL insurgents in Iraq and Syria, says Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF (Ret), executive director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke Univer- sity Law School in Durham, N.C. “In confronting ISIL, the conflicts

in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan teach us the limits of a population- centric strategy and remind us of the wisdom of an enemy-centric ap- proach,” Dunlap says. “The history of counterinsurgency shows that no matter how well-intended, the physi- cal presence of foreign force ‘boots- on-the-ground’ — to include even Americans — incites the indigenous population against what is too often viewed as an occupying force. The mere physical presence of American troops is itself a recruiting tool for the enemy.”

Dunlap suggests minimizing or eliminating U.S. boots-on-the-ground will remove much of the opportuni- ties for ISIL to exploit the notion that America is once again imposing itself on a Muslim population, adding, “It is vitally important that ISIL be de- nied the narrative it wants and needs. Thus, if we exploit the huge advances of recent years

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