MOAA Professional Series
Our national survival should not depend on the whims of terrorists or the evil designs of a rogue nation. Full development of a comprehensive missile defense system is more relevant today than ever before.
We can’t afford to get complacent about our safety. Someone needs to remind President Barack Obama and Congress that cutting money from the Missile Defense Agency’s budget would not be such a good idea.
— By Lt. Col. Donald L. Gilleland, USAF (Ret)
NORAD’s New Challenge: The Coming Threat of Public UAVS. Are We Ready?
A principal delay always exists between the private world and the military in regards to technology. Years before GPS became popular in everyday travel, our armed forces were using it to navigate the air, land, and sea. Today, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been utilized militarily against terrorism abroad, striking high-value targets with Hellfire missiles along with focusing onboard sensors for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance — all at safe-haven distances. Society has stood back in awe at this new war-fighting tactic, and for good reason: The use of perfected drone tech is undeniably useful. As the war on terror wanes, more than a decade later, civilian-sector demand has finally met up with reality. The Federal Aviation Administration has received marching orders from Congress to fully integrate UAVs into the national airspace by 2015 and has already acknowledged interest from over 50 different companies proposing their own pilotless, air-breathing designs. Integration is inevitable and should not be halted, as there is no denying it will prove beneficial economically: A leading study boasts around 70,000 jobs yielding $13.6 billion in the first three years alone! However, with new innovations come new concerns, and the most alarming one that we should elevate to high priority is the danger to our national security. Looming curiosity over the security of these new commercially owned drones, especially during the initial years across multiple companies, begs an ominous question: what of use of a UAV by terrorists as a weapon against our citizens and infrastructure?
The Boston Marathon bombings serve as a horrific reminder that terrorism persists in its domestic, isolated form. It is frightening enough to imagine new terrorist plots cropping up at war’s end; more unsettling is the notion that lone-wolf extremists continue to imagine, themselves, innovative methods to affect violence. UAVs may just be the next threat approaching, especially with our airspace growing a lot busier over the coming years. Analysts insist that the capability of developing a 5-pound, backpack-sized drone equipped with a warhead already exists. Also, the RAND Corp. has conducted thorough analysis on UAV danger. Their study assessed that attack by UAVs is viable and categorizes it by three methods: direct attack to infrastructure, vehicles, individuals; indirect attack for disruption or attack via alternate route; and aerial dispersal against crowds or buildings. Finally, just two years ago, the sum of these fears was actualized when a 26-year-old man was arrested for plotting to fly remote aircraft packed with military-grade explosives into the U.S. Capitol and Pentagon.
While enjoying the advent of the next commercial boom, we also need to be on guard. When security and prevention fails, our best measure of protection is the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is diligent in its centurion watch for any airborne object hostile to our nation. It has excellently prosecuted over 5,000 potential air threats since 9/11, and with a widening airspace, we can judge that that number will swell. But support must continue, and we must help our guardians adapt. Air sovereignty assets such as the F-16 are capable of employing on relatively small targets — provided they maintain sensor and visual contact. More to the point, the unprecedented surge of UAV presence may render even fighters inexpert compared to customary intercepts with wayward Cessnas or other general aviation. Alert squadrons and air defense sectors would do well to implement more UAV scenarios during recurring exercises; but, remember, sustaining the funding from the top down is where that process starts.
Moreover, the elusiveness of many of these drones poses serious problems for detection. Many to most UAVs register a faint radar cross section on the Joint Surveillance System, a continental radar array specified to track all air contacts in the U.S. and Canada — if they appear at all. That coupled with low and slow flight profiles remains burdensome for identification. This limitation, for instance, has a negative effect on another homeland asset: ground-based air defense systems; an Avenger/Stinger missile battery is less likely to swiftly engage a menacing drone if there is breakdown in the ID process. As UAV technology evolves, so too should radar capability be reinforced to match it.
While politicos across the Potomac look for new ways to pinch the defense budget, it is this officer’s hope that NORAD remains strong, backed by fellow citizens’ advocacies. The ongoing safety of an evolving airspace, with the momentous incorporation of UAVs into the fold, hinges on a robust air defense. Let the discussion of our protection from possible enemy drones commence.
— By Capt. Joseph A. Simonetti, New York ANG
NOVEMBER 2013 MILITARY OFFICER 65
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