In 2012, a stowaway fell out of an aircraft and landed in East Sheen, in south west London.
perimeter security is likely to consist of the FAA regulatory minimum standard of a 7ft chain link fence topped by 1ft of barbed wire. Ultimately, many airports almost certainly perceive the cost of advanced security solutions as unviable on the basis of the relative risk of vulnerabilities and threats to their perimeter.
Solutions
The length and geography of an airport’s perimeter make it somewhat more difficult to secure than, say, access to an aircraft via gate control. For example, there may be numerous options for access (crash gates, delivery gates, and so on), parts of the perimeter may be adjacent to open water, industrial land, business parks or even residential housing, and the average perimeter fence at a mid size US airport may be some 15km in length. There are technologies and designs which would make undetected access for would-be stowaways to airports via their perimeters more difficult. For example, at the most basic level airports can ensure the integrity of existing fences, have high- visibility patrols, perhaps as part of bird scaring, and conduct random checks for airside identification more frequently. To provide higher levels of protection,
where the threat level is deemed to be higher, perimeter intrusion detection systems (PIDS) are available, although they are still essentially at the proof of concept stage. PIDS incorporate such technologies as buried cable sensors, microwave radar, and smart cameras (CCTV) with intelligent video analytics. Preliminary evaluations of some manufacturers’ systems appear to be highly promising. For example, SightLogix’s ‘intelligent’ thermal imaging cameras are currently being trialled at Logan, Buffalo-Niagara. The ‘smart’ technology is argued to work in all weather and light conditions and discriminate between humans, vehicles and animals, alerting operators to approaches while tracking the target. The TSA conducted
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their own evaluation of the SightLogix outdoor [thermal] video analytic system and reported that it had performed accurately in over 900 scenarios. On the other hand, the system developed by a competitor, Raytheon, reportedly a $100 million network of fences, sensors, motion detectors, and video surveillance installed at JFK, has received far less favourable reviews. The system is reported to malfunction frequently, and recently failed to raise an alarm for the stranded jet skier who scaled the fence and walked across two runways; the words of the head of the union of the port authority police, Paul Nunziato, in a recent New York Post
“…many airports almost certainly perceive the cost of advanced security solutions as unviable on the basis of the relative risk of vulnerabilities and threats to their perimeter…”
article, were somewhat less restrained. Although intelligent perimeter security
is arguably the gold-standard, for those airports where intelligent systems are unviable, an affordable and simple layer of security can be added in the form of a high voltage pulsed electric wire at, say, the top of the chain link fence, which offers a non- lethal but hard to ignore shock every 2 or 3 seconds, although presumably it would not deter a would-be stowaway armed with bolt cutters. Also of note is that a US patent application has been lodged by Olivier Pujol, for a means of detecting stowaways in the landing gear housings of aircraft. Whilst interesting, given the low rate of stowaways in relation to flights and the high cost of false alarms, Pujol’s detection technology may not prove economically viable. Moreover, it would presumably not detect small objects such as IEDs, which are the main concern. None of these technologies offer a solution to the threat of unwanted vehicles breaching the perimeter fence. In accordance with Newton’s law of inertia, gates and fences are likely to fail at stopping some of the larger vehicles that may be driven at them at right- angles. Some of this vulnerability may be ameliorated by the use of ditches and rumble strips, but this is a vulnerability that remains very difficult to contain as rapid access to airfields is sometimes
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The body of a stowaway found inside the wheel well of an aircraft that landed in San Francisco in 2007 is taken away by the authorities.
necessary for safety. Indeed, the outcome of vehicle incursions could be a great deal more serious should the aim be to drive directly at an aircraft or fuel bowser. It is debatable whether any individual layer of security will ever offer full protection from security breaches, particularly if an airport is to be a commercially viable operation. However, it must aim to be good enough that in conjunction with other layers, it reduces the chances of success of a terrorist or criminal act to a level sufficiently low that it acts as a deterrent in the present, or can be defended in the future should a terrorist incident occur.
When the Perimeter (Back Door) is Secure, will the Airport be Safe? As existing vulnerabilities are closed, such as weak perimeter security, new vulnerabilities will be sought out. When airport perimeters are secure, stowaways will attempt other means of access to airports, such as with the help of an insider, or seek alternative ways to achieve their desired aims, such as using counterfeit passports. However, at the risk of sounding callous, stowaways never were the real issue; perimeter security must be improved as at present it is all too easy for a terrorist to gain access to an aircraft. That tightening perimeter security may stop stowaway attempts is an added bonus.
Andrew Gilbey, PhD, began his aviation career in the United Kingdom armed forces, much of it spent with the commando forces air squadron. He is currently a senior lecturer at Massey University’s School of Aviation (NZ),
teaching aviation security and conducting applied aviation psychology research. He may be contacted at:
a.p.gilbey@
massey.ac.nz
1. Kelly, Jon (13 September 2012). How often do plane stowaways fall from the sky? BBC News Magazine. Retrieved 21 February 2013 from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19562101 April 2013 Aviationsecurityinternational
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