as above 22,000ft there is insufficient oxygen to maintain consciousness and temperatures may fall to -60C; hypobaria upon descent; and falling several thousand feet from the aircraft when the landing gear suddenly lowers (and the stowaway may be dazed, confused or comatose). Very occasionally, hypothermia may ameliorate the effects of hypoxia, similar to how people have survived being immersed in ice cold waters. As desperate as they must be, presumably many stowaways do not have even a rudimentary understanding of the science behind the risks of stowing away in the landing gear compartments of large aircraft. The FAA reports that only around 20% of landing gear compartment stowaways survive, although this is only an estimate as some stowaways may survive and evade detection (perhaps helped to escape from the destination airport by an insider), while others may die undetected (by falling into the sea or into inhospitable terrain). According to the FAA, there have been 95 attempted stowaways on 84 flights around the world from 1996 to August 2012,1 originating from airports in countries such as Austria, Australia, Angola, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, India, Mongolia, Nigeria, Portugal, Republic of Panama, Saudi Arabia, Tahiti, and the United States. It is widely believed that most stowaways gain access to the airside of an airport by climbing the perimeter fence, then hiding close to the runway holding position — where the flight crew are performing their final checks and are awaiting clearance to manoeuvre onto the main runway and take- off — before climbing undetected onto the aircraft’s undercarriage and stowing away in the area where the landing gear would retract. The chance of being seen by air traffic control, aviation security, the flight crew, cabin crew or even a passenger is low, and even less so at night, as the taxi holding position would not be illuminated other than for the purpose of navigation. Some stowaways may also gain access to aircraft with the help of an airport ‘insider’, such as an employee with legitimate airside access, who may allow a would-be stowaway to piggyback through an access door or gate and gain access to an aircraft undetected.
Stowaways Divert Attention from the Bigger Issue Arguably the most worrying aspect of aircraft stowaways is that if it is possible to gain access to an aircraft for the purpose of stowing away, then it must also be possible to gain access for the purpose of planting a small improvised explosive device (IED) or improvised
April 2013 Aviationsecurityinternational
incendiary device (IID). Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that so much time and such vast sums of money are spent scrutinising passengers with fully paid tickets before they can gain access to an aircraft, making them remove their shoes and submitting to pat-down searches, developing blast-proof containers, screening 100% of baggage, and so on, while the perimeter security of some major airports appears so easily defeated. The aviation security vulnerability that stowaways expose is somewhat analogous
“...if it is possible to gain access to an aircraft for the purpose of stowing away, then it must also be possible to gain access for the purpose of planting a small IED or IID...”
to the one the Germans identified in France’s World War II defences when faced by the [Maginot] line of forts built to protect the French-German border from invasion. That is, the Germans simply circumvented the forts and instead, invaded through Belgium exploiting the much weaker defences on the France- Belgium border. Similarly, stowaways bypass the rigour of gate control security and gain access to an aircraft via the relatively weak security of the airport perimeter. If perimeter security is indeed so easy to penetrate that an ill-equipped stowaway can successfully gain access to an aircraft, then this has the potential to undermine all of the progress that has been made in other areas of aviation security. Because if a would-be stowaway can gain access to an aircraft, then so too can a well trained terrorist; there
“…a stranded jet skier wearing a bright yellow life- jacket climbed the 8ft wire fence at JFK, crossed two runways and eventually made it to Delta’s Terminal 3…”
may be a ‘Maginot Line’ defending gate control, but if a stowaway or a terrorist can so easily gain access to an aircraft by scaling the perimeter fence, then the funds spent on protecting gate control may be wasted.
On the ground, the wheel well may look like a cramped, stuffy compartment; in the air, the chances are it will become a coffi n.
Perimeter [In]Security: the stowaway’s boarding gate Many stowaways originate from African airports, where perimeter security is widely believed to be of a lower standard, although perimeters have also been breached in countries where security in principle is far superior (and threat much greater). For example, in 2012 alone, Brian Hedglin thwarted a razor wire fence at St. George Municipal Airport, Utah, using just a rug to scale the perimeter fence before stealing a 50-seater Bombardier CRJ200; a stranded jet skier wearing a bright yellow life-jacket climbed the 8ft wire fence at JFK, crossed two runways and eventually made it to Delta’s Terminal 3, before attracting the attention of ground crew; and a man drove his Jeep through a chain link fence and onto the runway at Philadelphia airport. Indeed, ABC news (21 March 2012) reported that more than 1,300 perimeter security incursions have occurred since 11 September 2001 at US airports, a figure almost certainly lowered by a failure to discover or report all such events. In the December 2003 issue of ASI, Tony Keane recounted an anecdote about an East African Airport in which aircraft baggage holds were targeted by local thieves; perhaps what was most surprising was that the aircraft were not outside the terminal but preparing to take-off.
In the US, the TSA publishes guidelines for airport planning and construction which cover perimeter security, although each airport will have its own security plan regarding the type of perimeter security deemed appropriate for the level of perceived threat. In some airports,
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