CBRN Scenarios: Airport Attacked with an Improvised C-Agent
Airports are very attractive targets for terrorists and are susceptible for CBRN terrorism because of their open nature. In this scenario, a terrorist brings a large suitcase to the airport, containing two different chemicals which will form a toxic cloud if mixed together. When the terrorist turns the suitcase on its side in the departure hall, the chemicals are mixed and a toxic mist of Hydrogen Cyanide is generated. Although the air circulation in an airport is high and the hall is relatively big, one can expect a
significant number of injured passengers and even some casualties as shown in the graphic. Currently, there are no airports that have active detection systems in place that would detect such an attack. This scenario is easy to prepare with limited technical knowledge. The materials to make the agent and device are readily available. With standard CBRN detection equipment and facemasks for staff, the consequences of this scenario can easily be mitigated.
The Plague Travels by Air A suicide terrorist packs Yersenis Pestis (Bubonic Plague) in two 75ml deodorant cans and brings them to the airport. At the security checkpoint, the deodorant spray cans are not inspected and allowed on board the plane. When most of the passengers are asleep on their intercontinental flight, the terrorist empties the two bottles while walking to the lavatory, infecting a large number of the passengers. When a flight attendant asks him what he is doing, the terrorist explains that the bottles were damaged and leaking and that he is actually walking to the toilet to throw them away. Since the flight attendant is not trained in the management of CBRN threats, the incident is not reported. When passengers become ill some days later, few doctors are able to make the correct diagnosis in time. The difficult part is getting access to Yersenis Pestis. However, numerous places in the former Eastern bloc still stockpile this agent. Making the dispersal device is not difficult. Although it is not likely any airline will have bio-detection equipment on board any time soon, training would make the difference in this scenario. If the flight attendant takes possession of the spray cans and hands them to the authorities after landing, a quick analysis will show the presence of Yersenis Pestis. The results from this analysis can start the treatment of the passengers and the effects of the attack will be virtually nil.
Dirty Bomb The most frequently used weapon for inflicting mass casualties is the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Instead of adding shrapnel such as nails to the device, the terrorist would add some grams of Cesium-137 to produce a ‘dirty bomb’. Explosives are within the ‘comfort zone’ of most terrorists, while radiological agents such as Cesium-137 are readily available in hospitals. Exploding a device with a radiological payload would not necessarily increase the number of direct victims. However, it would make the airport unusable for a long time. Without proper decontamination, the ‘downtime’ could be measured in years instead of months.
Radiation detectors at the entrance of the airport would help detect the
threat. When staff have face masks, they would be protected against inhaling radioactive particles.
Ricin in In-flight Meals Ricin is relatively easy to make at home from Castor Beans and was made ‘famous’ when the KGB-supported Bulgarian secret police used it to kill dissident Georgi Markov in London. In this scenario, a terrorist finds a job at the catering company providing in-flight meals at a European airport for an Asian airline. When the terrorist has produced sufficient ricin, he adds it to the salads for the in-flight meal. When passengers eat the salad onboard, they fall ill within a few hours. Fatalities will occur after a day and a half.
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Using protective equipment requires training, not just on how to don a mask but more importantly on what to do when you are protected. Staff with PPE can actually help the public in the terminal building with evacuating the premises. However, those staff members should have confidence in their equipment, and should understand what they can and cannot do. For flight crews, CBRN training should not only be about using PPE, but should include CBRN awareness training in which they learn to recognise that a CBRN incident is underway, even if they lack CBRN detection equipment. Finally, detection, protection and training need to be part of an airport/airline CBRN doctrine which should include choices on what to do given different scenarios. For example, if a CBRN agent is released in the departure hall, should we turn off the HVAC system, or turn it to maximum? Most guidelines suggest (or instruct) one turn the HVAC off, however simulating a CBRN attack on your airport may show that you actually need different countermeasures which are more appropriate for your circumstances.
The most important thing when dealing with the
threat of CBRN terrorism is knowledge. Without understanding what the threat is, how it can manifest itself, what the impact may be and how to deal with it, it is difficult to act in an effective way. Buying detectors, masks and training is all very well, but if airport or airline security management does not know what CBRN means, it will be difficult to use the resources in the right way. Knowledge also means having a concept or methodology of addressing the CBRN threat. The presented risk assessment methodology based on the terrorists’ CBRN capabilities and intent is a helpful tool in accurately assessing the CBRN threat to civil aviation.
Ilja M. Bonsen is founder and Managing Director of IB Consultancy, an independent defence and security firm specialising in non-conventional threats. Elsa Schrier works as a consultant at IB Consultancy in Brussels. In her work she focuses on CBRNe and European Security and Defence Policies. The authors can be contacted at:
information@ib-g.com or ask them a question in the CBRNe Group on LinkedIn.
April 2013 Aviationsecurityinternational
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