November 1997: Tony Blair meets Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, but sources say Britain, under Blair, planned a coup against Mugabe
exit to the hoax, referred Morgan Tsvan- girai to one Ari Ben-Menashe, an Israeli national who lived in Montreal, Canada, who apparently was hired by the Nigerians to be Tsvangirai’s Judas Iscariot. Tsvangirai was made to believe that
Ben-Menashe was part of the communi- cation system of the “Nigerian generals”. So he dutifully travelled to London and Montreal to meet him. In meetings held in the two cities, recorded secretly on video by Ben-Menashe, Tsvangirai confirmed that he wanted President Mugabe “eliminated”. Ben-Menashe later reported Tsvangirai to the Zimbabwean authorities (including supplying the tapes and all), which led to Tsvangirai being indicted for treason back home in Harare. According to sources, the real intention
of the Nigerians appears to have been to extort money from the British, which they succeeded in doing, and to have Tsvangirai locked up for a long, long time. Soon after the meeting with Air Mar-
shall Shiri, one of the two MDC officials who went to see him fled to Britain as life out of prison looked increasingly uncertain. Tere was, however, one more serious
It was calculated that, swamped by
numbers, the Zimbabwean police would, in panic, fire live rounds into the crowds, thereby providing the necessary “trigger” for the military coup. Te “Final Push”, however, never saw
the light of day for lack of marchers. Meanwhile, as they waited for the
“Final Push”, after the coup did not hap- pen following the announcement of the election results, sources say the British and the MDC became anxious to find out if, in fact, the Nigerians had communicated anything to the Zimbabwe military. To seek confirmation, two MDC offi-
cials were despatched to meet the Zimba- bwean Air Force commander, Air Marshall Perrance Shiri, to deliver a message that Tsvangirai was interested in working with him when he became president. Unknown to the MDC officials, the
meeting with the Air Marshall was recorded on tape, after Shiri had notified his political
superiors and Zimbabwe’s intelligence serv- ice before the arrival of the officials. Sadly for the MDC, the Air Marshall rebuffed their overtures. According to sources, the more impor-
tant outcome of that encounter was that the Air Marshall showed no knowledge of the coup plan by the Nigerians. Tis, more or less, confirmed that the British and the MDC had become victims of a 419 scam; an expensive hoax! Ten the Nigerians disappeared into
thin air. But before their disappearance, they did two other things. First, according to sources, they de-
manded an additional $5m which they claimed would be given to senior coup leaders to agree to hand over power to Tsvangirai. Te British were said to have refused to hand over any more cash, but instead offered to open offshore accounts for the coup leaders. Second, the Nigerians, seeking a quick
development from the bogus coup bid. Sources say when Welshman Ncube, the then No. 2 to Tsvangirai, got to know about the coup plot, he protested and refused to be a party to the project as, he believed, it would not produce a democratic govern- ment. Ncube is now the leader of the breaka-
way MDC faction, now popularly called MDC-N, which split from the main body in 2005 and won 10 seats in Parliament in 2008. Tus, according to sources, the MDC
split of 2005 was, in fact, a consequence of the differences between Tsvangirai and the others over whether or not to carry out the military coup against Mugabe. At the time of the split in August 2005, it
was popularly believed that internal MDC disagreement over whether or not to par- ticipate in the then impending Senate elec- tions, was the cause. But sources now say that that was only a red herring.
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