(AU), the chief regional organisations of West Africa, supported the certification by the special representative and endorsed the results announced by the Electoral Com- mission. Te legal basis for the UN certifica-
tion mandate is derived from the Pretoria Agreement and subsequent Declaration on the Implementation of the Pretoria Agree- ment. Ivorians themselves were keenly aware
that elections were likely to take place in an environment of mistrust and lack of confidence in the relevant institutions, and so turned to the United Nations as an impartial presence. Te United Nations is proud to have fulfilled its role in accordance with the relevant inter- national agreements. In the course of the crisis, some
called for a recount. Yet the idea behind a recount was to pave the
Security forces loyal to him used heavy
weapons against civilians in communi- ties perceived as strongholds of President Ouattara, against UN peacekeepers, and against supporters of Ouattara at the Golf Hotel in Abidjan, which was during the crisis the temporary seat of the legitimate government. Acting with the unanimous support
of the UN Security Council, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) undertook limited military operations, strictly within the bounds of its mandate, to protect civilians. It did not, at any stage, seek to stop or facilitate military gains by any side. Troughout the crisis, UNOCI had
undertaken every effort to implement its mandate in an impartial manner and pro- tect civilians irrespective of their political affiliation. Just as the mission provided security at the Golf Hotel, so it is current- ly providing security to Mr Gbagbo and more than 50 officials of his Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). Te impartiality of the United Na-
tions does not mean neutrality. Its peacekeepers had a responsibility to act in the face of possible grave violations of human rights and international humani- tarian law. President Mbeki claims that the crisis
way for a “negotiated politi- cal solution” that would have led to a power-sharing ar- rangement, a solution that President Mbeki seemed to favour – but which would have set a dangerous prec- edent for the continent and undermined the principles of
democracy. Tere should be zero tolerance for desperate acts by rulers seeking to stay in power against the will of the people.
Violence Te post-election violence was a di- rect result of Mr Gbagbo’s refusal to accept defeat and his repeated rejec- tion of all efforts to find a peaceful solution.
confirms the marginalisation of the Af- rican Union. In fact, the AU refused to allow itself to be used as a vehicle for an unconstitutional grab for power, thereby heightening its legitimacy. Te ultimate vindication of the prin-
cipled position taken by Ecowas, the AU, and the United Nations came from the Ivorian Constitutional Council itself. On 5 May, President Yao N’Dré set aside the fabricated results announced five months earlier, proclaimed President Ouattara the legitimate winner, and swore him into of- fice the next day. Elections, on their own, will never be
a panacea for the root causes of conflict. National reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire will not be easy, but the country is on the right track toward reclaiming its role as the pillar of stability in the sub-region. African leaders who wish to play a con-
structive role may begin by offering sup- port to that country as it moves forward rather than trying to reorder facts or rewrite history.
New African | October 2011 | 15
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