dress) is lying on the floor. Below: Presidents Mbeki and Ouattara
the victor in the Ivorian conflict. Tis addressed the national interests
of France, consistent with its Françafrique policies, which aim to perpetuate a par- ticular relationship with its former African colonies. Tis is in keeping with remarks made by former French President François Mitterand when he said: “Without Af- rica, France will have no history in the 21st century,” which former French min- ister Jacques Godfrain confirmed when he said: “A little country [France], with a small amount of strength, we can move a planet because [of our]
...relations with 15 or 20 African countries...” Te AU is also not without blame, as it
elected to abandon its neutrality as a peacemaker, deciding to be a partisan belligerent in the Ivorian conflict.”
“The United Nations
concentrated murder of civilians took place! Tis recalls the United Nations’ failure
to end the more catastrophic murder and abuse of civilians in eastern DR Congo!
Incontrovertible conclusions Te Ivorian reality points to a number of incontrovertible conclusions. Te agreed conditions for the holding
of democratic elections in Côte d’Ivoire were not created. Despite strong allegations of electoral fraud, the international community decided against conducting any verification of the process and the announced results. Tis left unanswered the vitally important ques- tion of who actually had won the elections, which Ouattara might have done.
Te United Nations elected to aban- don its neutrality as a peacemaker, deciding to be a partisan belliger- ent in the Ivorian conflict.
France used its privileged place in the Security Council to position itself to play an im- portant role in determining the future of Côte d’Ivoire, its former colony in which, inter alia, it has significant economic interests. It joined the United Nations to en- sure that Ouattara emerged as
m
failed to assert itself to persuade everybody to work to achieve reconciliation among the Ivorians, and therefore durable peace. Tragically, the outcome that has been
achieved in Côte d’Ivoire further entrenches the endemic conflict in this country. Tis is because it has placed in the ex-
clusive hands of the failed rebellion of 2002 the ability to determine the future of the country, whereas the objective situation dictated and dictates that the people of Côte d’Ivoire should engage one another as equals to determine their shared destiny. During the decade he served as president
of Côte d’Ivoire, Gbagbo had no possibility to act on his own to reunify the country and achieve reconciliation among its diverse people, despite the existence of negotiated agreements in this regard. As he serves as president of the country, Ouattara will not succeed to realise these objectives, acting on his own, outside the context of honest agreement with the sections of the Ivorian population represented by Gbagbo. What was to come was foreseen by the
then US ambassador in Côte d’Ivoire, Wanda L. Nesbitt. In July 2009, she advised the US government: “It now appears that the Ouaga IV agree-
ment, [the fourth agreement to the Ouaga- dougou Political Agreement which prescribed that disarmament should precede the elec- tions], is fundamentally an agreement be- tween Blaise Compaoré [President of Burkina Faso] and Laurent Gbagbo to share control of
New African June 2011 | 37
Former President Gbagbo’s relations after his capture. His wife, Simone (in the light green
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