base of the 2002 rebellion include such inflammable issues as transnational ten- sions affecting especially Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, Ivorian ethnic and religious antagonisms, sharing of political power, and access to economic and social power and opportunities.
The grievances In this regard, the international commu- nity has assiduously suppressed proper ap- preciation of various explosive allegations which, rightly or wrongly, have informed and will continue to inform the views of the Gbagbo-supporting population in southern Côte d’Ivoire – and much of Francophone Africa! Tese are that Ouattara is a for- eigner born in Burkina Faso, that together with Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré he was responsible for the 2002 rebellion; that his accession to power would result in the takeover of the country especially by Burkinabé foreigners; and that histori- cally, to date, he has been ready to advance French interests in Côte d’Ivoire. Taking all this into account, the African
Union understood that a lasting solution of the Ivorian crisis necessitated a negotiated agreement between the two belligerent Ivo- rian factions, focused on the interdepend- ent issues of democracy, peace, national reconciliation and unity. In protracted negotiations from 2002,
the Ivorians agreed that the presidential elections would not be held until various conditions had been met. Tese included the reunification of the
country, the restoration of the national administration to all parts of the Ivorian territory, and the disarmament of the rebels and all militia and their integration in the national security machinery, with the lat- ter process completed at least two months ahead of any presidential elections. Despite the fact that none of this was
honoured, the presidential elections were al- lowed to proceed. In the end, Ouattara has been installed as president of Côte d’Ivoire. Gbagbo, and his wife Simone, have ended up as humiliated prisoners. Many Ivorians have died and have been
displaced, much infrastructure has been de- stroyed, and historic animosities have been exacerbated in the lead-up to this outcome.
What went wrong Many things have gone radically wrong along the road to this result. Agreements
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