© Imperial War Museum; Crown Copyright MOD
W
artime prime minister Winston Churchill’s immortal quote ‘never in the field of human conflict was so
much owed by so many to so few’ sealed a place in history for RAF fighter pilots. Yet, the failure of the Luftwaffe to secure air
superiority over the English Channel in 1940 cannot be attributed solely to the bravery, ability and vast contribution of Supermarine Spitfire and Hawker Hurricane commandeers. Other elements had a significant impact; for
example the use of radar-identified approaching German fighters and bombers allowing the British enough time to take off and repel attackers. And even if enemy aircraft passed the UK’s coastline, rendering radar useless, an army of volunteers equipped with recognition booklets, known as the Royal Observer Corps, scoured the skies with binoculars. The Commander of the Luftwaffe, Hermann
Göring, underestimated the benefits reaped by the British from radar stations and instead directed attacks towards cities and air bases. Minister for armaments and war production for the Third Reich, Albert Speer, claimed in his memoirs, Inside the Third Reich, that the leadership of Nazi Germany functioned on a basis of secrecy, corruption and a dictatorial system, which resulted in an anarchic style of leadership in which Göring was implicit. The regime did not produce the efficiencies that many observers of Nazi Germany had expected. The design of the UK’s fighter aircraft also gave
pilots advantages over their German counterparts. The Reginald Mitchell-designed Spitfire drew its pedigree from the designer’s success at the Schneider Cup: a prize competition for seaplanes. So, who or what was it that decided the Battle
of Britain? Science and technology arguably swung the fight
in the UK’s favour. The government’s aeronautical research committee – led by its chair and inventor Henry Tizard and physicist Robert Watson-Watt – had erected 70ft-high masts in Orford Ness, Suffolk, by May 1935. During an experiment, they detected that aircraft had flown across their test area. The results were successful enough for the committee to seek and obtain further funding, which would allow it to work on a more comprehensive detection system. The team moved to the village of Bawdsey
in Suffolk, which was to become home to the UK’s first radar station. It was identified by the
Winston Churchill in the Cabinet Room at No 10 Downing Street
Luftwaffe as a target and was bombed on at least 12 occasions. However, concrete walls and a roof created to dissipate the force of a blast stopped its destruction. Bawdsey Radar was defended by three 40mm Bofors guns and two .303 Lewis anti-aircraft guns. According to a spokesperson for Bawdsey Radar, there were several attacks on the station during 1940, which did little damage, with no casualties and on October 18, anti-aircraft gunners shot down a German bomber. A chain of radar stations was in place around
the coast of the UK by 1939. According to a spokesperson for the Imperial War Museum: ‘Radar was the eyes of [RAF] Fighter Command, without which it would have been unable to see incoming raids early enough to have directed defending fighters to intercept. ‘But its effectiveness was greatly enhanced by
being only one element of, and integrated into, a sophisticated command and control network, which received the raw information of radar plots and rapidly applied it to direct the use of precious resources of pilots and aircraft to the best possible effect.’ However, not everyone in the RAF was as
enthusiastic about radar as its creators. According to fighter ace Douglas Bader’s biographer Paul Brickhill, during a meeting called by the air ministry soon after the battle, Bader said: ‘The
We shall
conquer together or we shall die together – Winston Churchill
www.armedforcesday.org.uk SHOW YOUR SUPPORT 43
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