noRWAY
tHERE Is no LAW AGAInst tHE ACtUAL UsE In tHE
MARKEt of sIGns DEVoID of DIstInCtIVE CHARACtER
Nobody can go to the authorities and claim compensation because the cereal restricting the availability of colours for the other traders who off er for sale
they hated was marketed under a trademark so utterly devoid of distinctive goods or services of the same type as those in respect of which registration
character that they accidentally bought that same cereal again. Th ere is is sought. Th is very real and very important general interest would also
no law against the actual use in the market of signs devoid of distinctive explain the administrative practice followed by most jurisdictions to refuse
character. Indeed, once a non-distinctive sign has been used to a suffi cient marks consisting of single letters or single numbers—the options are simply
degree, distinctive character is considered to be acquired and the mark is too limited to go around.
welcomed on board the registry. Trademark law has no business minding
consumers’ best interests. It is there to protect the economic interests of
Th is accounts for many refusals based on 7(1)(b)—and most would agree
the holders of trademarks and to regulate the market so that no one gets an
that no one should be aff orded exclusive rights to something legitimately
unfair advantage.
required by other traders. But why are trademarks that are devoid of intrinsic
distinctive character refused out of consideration for the consumer? Th e fact
Th ere are good reasons to refuse certain marks that are not descriptive. is that once one introduces something as illusive as “the perception of the
Th e ECJ has, justifi ably, refused many marks consisting of the shape of the average consumer”, every reasonable degree of predictability is cast to the
product (fi gurative or three-dimensional marks) under 7(1)(b), the rule wind. In practice, the decision-taker in these cases, whether an examiner or
that seemingly protects the consumer. According to the court, the average a judge, makes a more or less qualifi ed guess as to how a given mark will be
consumer does not make assumptions about the origin of products on perceived among consumers. It is a guess because the assessment of marks
the basis of their shape or the shape of their packaging. But that does not that are devoid of distinctive character is not tangible or concrete. With
prevent three-dimensional marks from being registered. Th e test is simply descriptive marks, it is relatively easy to fi nd examples where a word or a
whether or not the shape in question departs signifi cantly from the norm combination of words is used as a generic term. With non-descriptive signs
of the sector. that are devoid of distinctive character, no such references can be made. Th e
result is decisions that are frequently quite poorly reasoned and that oft en
It is not very hard to spot the real reason why these marks are refused. If the
seem random. In eff ect, refusals of this kind are based to a large extent on
shape resembles other shapes on the market, a decision to reserve it for the
‘gut feeling’, of personal likes and dislikes, and this is clearly unacceptable to
use of one single undertaking would entail giving one an unfair advantage
trademark holders, applicants and representatives alike.
over others, which of course is precisely the public interest underlying
7(1)(c). In the well-known Libertell decision (2003), the ECJ held that in One large group of non-descriptive marks that are refused under 7(1)(b)
assessing the potential distinctiveness of a given colour as a trademark are slogans. In the Das Prinzip der Bequemlichkeit decision of the ECJ, a
(under 7(1)(b)), regard must be had to the general interest in not unduly phrase used about three-dimensional marks was applied to slogans as well:
www.worldipreview.com World Intellectual Property Review Digest 2009 119
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