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NEWS Inquiry resumes amid new Grenfell revelations


NEW EXPERT witnesses and opening hearings took place amid reports about the cladding and fire doors. Two further expert witnesses were


instructed: Dr Ivan Stoianov ‘as to the sufficiency of water supply and water pressure to Grenfell Tower for the purpose of providing water to allow the London Fire Brigade to effectively fight the fire’; and Rodney Hancox ‘as to legislation, regulations, guidance and industry practice relevant to the gas supply to and within Grenfell Tower and the extent to which the presence of gas contributed to the spread of the fire and to the conditions inside’. In the hearings, chair Sir Martin


Moore-Bick was asked to rule on whether the cladding materials that were used on Grenfell Tower complied with Approved Document B [ADB] of the building regulations. Stephanie Barwise, representing


survivors and the bereaved, argued that the aluminium composite material and polyethylene core did not, stating: ‘We and the government... regard it as clear that on its proper interpretation, [ADB] part 4 [...] paragraphs 12.5 and 12.7, require the core of the panels to also be of limited combustibility on a building over 18 metres tall, and we would expect some other core participants may take the same view. ‘The aluminium composite


panel, Reynobond PE [...] is not a material of limited combustibility, as is apparent from the original and subsequent British Board of Agrément [BBA] certificate, issued in respect of it.’ She acknowledged that this ‘has been disputed since the fire’, asking Sir Martin to ‘declare the obvious as soon as possible’. Stephen Hockman, on behalf


of Arconic, made an ‘unscheduled statement’ in response: ‘The use of materials that were not of limited combustibility did not in itself give rise to the breach of the regime. To establish such a breach would involve considering a much wider range of factors.’ Inside Housing noted that his statement ‘leaves open the


6 MAY 2018 www.frmjournal.com


question of whether the materials themselves’ complied with ADB, with the government putting forward ‘the same argument as Ms Barwise’; while cladding manufacturers ‘have claimed that they were following a different interpretation’ of ADB. Under this, the core of the panels would only be required to be Class 0, a ‘less stringent requirement’. The Times later reported that the


safety rating of the Arconic cladding used ‘had been downgraded after it failed fire safety tests’, but the BBA stated that it was ‘not informed’. The cladding was installed during a refurbishment in 2015, but The Times says that Arconic ‘knew in 2014 that the tests rating for the cladding panels had been downgraded’. Arconic told BBC News that it


had shared the downgraded rating with ‘various customers and certification authorities’, and that test results had been published on the website of the French testing facility. The BBA in turn had given the Reynobond PE panels a “B” rating, ‘the second best’, in 2008 for their ‘reaction to fire’. This, The Times stated, meant


that ‘some in the construction industry believed’ this meant ‘it was safe to use on tower blocks’, but further tests ordered by Arconic before the refurbishment of Grenfell ‘resulted in a lower classification of C or E for different types of panel’. Finally, a 2016 Arconic brochure described the cladding ‘as suitable


for buildings up to ten metres in height’, while Grenfell Tower is 67 metres in height. Police tests meanwhile found that one of the front doors for a flat in the tower was supposed to hold back fire for 30 minutes, but lasted only 15. The Guardian reported on the investigations, and that families affected by the fire were sent a letter by Scotland Yard which stated that ‘independent experts have advised that the risk to public safety is low, and that evidence from the suspected issue does not change that assessment’. It was not clear whether other doors were ‘of the same type’, as further investigation was needed to ‘establish if the heat in the rest of the building may have compromised its fire resistance prior to the test’. In response, Kensington and


Chelsea Council ‘acknowledged’ that doors tested had ‘provided less protection than guidelines recommend’, but called the results ‘inconclusive’, suggesting that wider safety implications ‘were not yet clear’. A spokesperson said: ‘We understand this news will be of particular concern to residents in this borough, which is why we are urging the Government to move as quickly as it can to give us clarity about the situation.’ A police spokesman added in


turn: ‘As part of this investigation experts tested a flat front door taken from Grenfell Tower. The door tested was designed to resist fire for up to 30 minutes but during the test it was only found to resist the fire for approximately 15 minutes – a much shorter period than expected. ‘The forensic examination and


the testing phase is ongoing and we are not unable to comment as to the potential impact or otherwise that any test result may have on the overall criminal investigation. ‘We have shared our information with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government as the appropriate government departments, so they are able to take any action required.’


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