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Column: Silicon systems design


Figure 1: Intent-controlled AI-assisted verifi cation fl ow


it matters, where it applies and what evidence is required for confi dence. It connects the specifi cation, architecture, verifi cation plan, testbench, assertions, coverage model and sign-off review into a coherent engineering argument. At the block level, intent may include


register behaviour, reset sequencing, protocol rules, interrupt handling, error responses and corner-case operation.


At the sub-system level, it may include arbitration, ordering, coherence, quality of service, power-management dependencies and security boundaries. At the system level, it may include soſt ware-visible behaviour, integration assumptions, performance expectations and recovery paths. T is intent is the control layer above verifi cation execution. It allows a team to


ask the right questions: Does this test map to a required scenario? Does this assertion check the intended behaviour or only a narrow implementation detail? Does this coverage point represent a meaningful risk, or is it just a number? Does this waiver close a valid exception, or does it hide an unresolved issue? AI does not remove the need for these


questions – it makes them more urgent. AI can support verifi cation execution


Figure 2: Applying AI risk management thinking to AI-assisted verifi cation [Source: NIST]


and analysis, but sign-off confi dence depends on whether the generated evidence remains aligned with the explicit verifi cation intent.


Where AI introduces risk AI-generated verifi cation content oſt en appears credible because it uses the domain’s language. A sequence, assertion, coverage suggestion or debug explanation may look familiar enough to be accepted too quickly. T at is one of the main risks. T e tool may not understand the full


design intent, legal stimulus constraints, previous assumptions, verifi cation environment limitations, safety goals, security requirements or system-level dependencies. It may generate something that is technically formatted but contextually wrong. It may also introduce duplication, noise or false confi dence if outputs are not reviewed and traced. Traceability is a particular concern. If an AI-generated test, property or summary


www.electronicsworld.co.uk July/August 2026 13


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