PHILIPPINE SMRS | FOCUS ON ASIA


The SATER housed at the PRR-1 building. Source: Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI).


have logged at least two continuous years of safe commercial operation in its country of origin before local regulators will approve a construction licence. By early 2027, the National Transmission Corporation and the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines are scheduled to complete comprehensive structural audits to ensure the national grid can seamlessly absorb an initial 600MWe–1,200MWe of initial nuclear capacity from the pioneer facility, which is expected to deliver its first power to the grid between 2032 and 2035, with long-term plans to scale the nation’s nuclear fleet to 4,800MWe by 2050.


A difficult history The Philippines first began exploring nuclear capabilities in 1958 when the US supplied a small 1MW open-pool general- purpose reactor under the Atoms for Peace programme. Commissioned in 1963, the Philippine Research Reactor-1 (PRR-1) was designed entirely for scientific experiments, medical radioisotope production and academic training. Operated by the Philippines Atomic Energy Commission,


the facility is located at the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) compound inside the University of the Philippines Diliman campus in Quezon City. In 1984, the government contracted US General Atomics to convert and upgrade it into a 3MW TRIGA Mark III reactor, using a unique uranium-zirconium hydride alloy fuel. Plans for a full-scale commercial NPP emerged during the


1973 global oil crisis. President Ferdinand Marcos Sr used his Martial Law powers to decree the immediate construction of an NPP at Napot Point in Morong, Bataan. Marcos overruled his own advisory panel, which favoured a detailed $700m (43.72bn pesos) bid from General Electric, to award the contract to Westinghouse Electric for a less detailed $500m proposal. It was later revealed that Westinghouse paid millions of dollars in “commissions” to Herminio Disini, a relative of the Marcos family, to broker the deal. Due to severe inflation, systemic corruption and delays,


the cost of the 621MWe reactor rose from $500m to $2.3bn, accounting for a significant portion of the entire foreign debt at the time. Construction was severely disrupted by external events and rising local opposition. Following the partial


nuclear meltdown at the Three Mile Island facility in the US, Marcos was forced to order an independent safety audit and freeze construction. The audit uncovered more than 4,000 structural safety


defects. Investigators found chaotic, uninsulated internal wiring, unstable high-pressure pipe brackets and faulty valves. Critics accused Westinghouse of changing design paperwork rather than physically fixing the hardware. Protests intensified after volcanologists and geologists pointed out that the plant was built directly on the seismically active slopes of Mount Natib and near Mount Pinatubo, which erupted catastrophically in 1991 after being dormant for 500 years. By 1985, the plant was physically complete, but escalating public protests and political instability prevented Marcos from loading the nuclear fuel. In February 1986, the People Power Revolution overthrew the Marcos regime and President Corazon Aquino inherited the controversial facility. Two months later, the Chornobyl disaster occurred in Ukraine, cementing public fear of nuclear energy. Citing unresolvable safety hazards and the rampant


corruption tied to its origin, the Aquino administration mothballed the plant indefinitely. Despite never generating power, the Philippine Government was legally bound to honour the international loans allocating taxpayer money to clear the debt until it was paid off in 2007. Since then, the National Power Corporation has spent an estimated $40m–50m a year just on keeping the machinery preserved and air-conditioned. The historical timeline of the BNPP has come full circle under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who is seeking to revive his father’s unfinished project, in parallel with the new policy initiative, to solve the country’s modern power grid crisis. The proposed revival faces two major hurdles: a complex legal tug-of-war between local and national laws, and its structural and geological safety issues. While the national government holds the ultimate legal authority to decide the fate of the Bataan plant, there is also the possibility that the independent regulator, PhilATOM, could block the Bataan revival due to the strict safety criteria written directly into RA 12305, which mandates that nuclear sites cannot be located in areas classified as high-risk for natural hazards.


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