SAFETY & SECURITY | TARGETING NUCLEAR
The Seven Indispensable Pillars and Five Concrete Principles for Nuclear Safety and Security articulated by the IAEA since the start of the war in Ukraine offer a useful starting point for establishing best practices for nuclear safety and security in warzones, the report says. Reiterating commitments to existing legal provisions and broader norms, and calling out states that do not respect these, is important for making sure that the use of military force that threatens the safety of nuclear installations and poses a risk to civilians is not normalised. However, some states may still choose to disregard their International Humanitarian Law (IHL) obligations or to find ways to justify their actions even when such justifications are unconvincing or disingenuous.
● Considering options for strengthening passive defences around nuclear installations and auxiliary systems and equipment which support the safe operation of nuclear facilities (including auxiliary elements like water supply systems and electrical infrastructure). Most nuclear power plants operating today are already protected by reinforced concrete containment structures, making them challenging, although certainly not impossible, to penetrate. Constructing thicker containment structures over existing reactors that already benefit from reinforced containment would be a resource-intensive undertaking which would be incommensurate with the risk of an accidental strike and ineffective against an adversary determined to penetrate the reactor core to release radioactive material.Even in the most economically advanced or security-minded states, resources are not unlimited; this is likely to be especially true in the context of a broader military conflict, when already-limited sources must be allocated across a range of defence and security priorities. In all cases, then, additional physical protection would be subject to cost–benefit considerations and would be dependent on the extent and nature of the threat faced by a given state. For instance, it may be reasonable to expect that Ukraine or even Finland would expend the necessary resources to strengthen the containment structures around their wet spent fuel storage facilities, but similar measures would seem excessive for Canada or the UK. Beyond- Design Basis Threat (DBT) process and broader national-level risk assessments must therefore take into account the likelihood of potential military attacks on their nuclear sites by hostile states. Furthermore, some preventive and mitigation measures may have unintended consequences that could, in fact, increase other undesirable consequences of attack or make attacks more likely. Additionally, an overly cautious approach to risk management – for instance, foregoing nuclear energy altogether out of a fear of possible military threat – may have other undesirable and unnecessary economic, environmental and political drawbacks. As such, the departure point for any risk-mitigation measures should be a realistic assessment of the precise nature and degree of risk that a given state’s nuclear infrastructure is likely to face from military threats. The paper adds that passive defences may need to be supported with active defence measures in the instance
22 | June 2025 |
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of an active conflict, including the deployment of layered and distributed air defence, for example. However, the deployment of military capabilities near to nuclear installations may also have the unintended consequence of increasing the risks to facilities.
● Creating redundancy in and decentralising nuclear installations and related networks. This may help shift the cost–benefit calculus for an attacking state by increasing the number of targets that need to be attacked to have meaningful effects on a system and reducing the effects of single strikes. In the context of nuclear energy generation, this may include a shift away from large gigawatt-scale reactors towards the deployment of small modular reactors. However, decentralisation may also have the unintended consequences of increasing the risks of hazardous material release and harm to civilian populations by increasing the number and distribution of facilities containing toxic materials.
● Improving whole-of-society resilience to nuclear safety incidents, including through efforts to raise levels of emergency preparedness, risk awareness and education on nuclear safety among the public and political leadership. This should involve the pre-emptive formulation of risk and crisis communication strategies, as well as tools for countering disinformation and misinformation, which prioritise the establishment of trust between the population and authorities, and should also offer clear information and instructions. Any such efforts must be commensurate to the risk facing a given state and population, and will have to be balanced against the need to avoid alarmism and the risk of inciting unnecessary anxiety.
Responding to the potential for conflict Militaries that are determined to respect the principles of international law and the safety of civilians and the environment more broadly should have the necessary guidance and tools to pursue legitimate military objectives safely. At the same time, countries should be prepared to protect and ensure the nuclear safety of nuclear installations that may be targeted by states that do not share a similar respect. Considering the operational and strategic logic behind such military activity, as well as its likely consequences, can clearly help political and military leadership prepare to defend against related threats and mitigate risks. As the number of nuclear installations around the world
is expected to grow, militaries, national and international policymakers, and regulators need to consider the possibility that militaries may increasingly run the risk of encountering and having to operate or contest control of nuclear sites in the course of military operations. The paper concludes that thoughtful management of risk
and corresponding trade-offs requires an understanding of the motivations for an attack on any given facility. Considering those consequences of an attack that are of greatest concern and the best approaches to mitigate them can therefore help with the prioritisation of risk- management efforts to appropriately and effectively address both the incentives and consequences of a potential attack. ■
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