TARGETING NUCLEAR | SAFETY & SECURITY
Left: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has bought renewed focus on conflict potentially affecting nuclear installations such as the Zaporizhzhia NPP Source: Energoatom
a case-by-case basis – from a limited roll-back of a nuclear programme to completely disabling a country’s ability to continue its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Military strikes on facilities can also demonstrate the attacking state’s resolve to do what is necessary to prevent the emergence of a nuclear weapons capability. However, the prevalent opinion suggests that military
force is limited in its effectiveness as a counterproliferation tool and – in isolation – is best-suited to delaying, rather than outright eliminating any nuclear ambitions. Counterproliferation strikes may be carried out against a range of installations across the nuclear fuel cycle, each presenting unique risks to civilian populations and the environment. Russia’s military advance on and occupation of Ukraine’s
Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), in contrast, appears to have been driven by an intention to disrupt and eventually co-opt the energy generating capacity of the plant. The targeting of enemy energy generation and distribution infrastructure is well established in the military doctrine of many alliances and states – including those of NATO. The report argues that the expected growth of the importance of nuclear power in the global energy mix in the coming decades may therefore increase the likelihood that future armed conflict will see greater targeting of nuclear energy infrastructure. This may not necessarily entail direct attacks on nuclear reactors but on auxiliary systems – such as the water and electricity supply – under the erroneous assumption that such attacks carry limited risk. It is only partially true, the paper says, that attacks on supporting and transmission infrastructure are lower risk: these systems are all critical for the safe operation of a plant. A loss of off-site power (LOOP) incident, a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a station blackout (SBO) (when the station loses access to both off-site power and emergency generators) can have catastrophic results for a nuclear plant. This is something that the IAEA has repeatedly drawn attention to in the context of the war in Ukraine. The IAEA has highlighted the risk to nuclear safety posed by the frequent disconnection of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, and the ZNPP in particular, from off-site power supply and the risks of potential coolant loss following the draining of the Kakhovka reservoir. Off-site power and water supply are critical for the maintenance of a plant’s safe and secure operation. Attacks on nuclear facilities may also be carried out with the express intention of releasing radioactive or other toxic material as an area denial strategy. Radiological or chemical contamination of territory complicates and delays an adversary’s military operations in the affected area.
However, most militaries have at least some ability to shield against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) hazards and to continue operations in a contaminated environment – particularly if a mission is critical. As such, ultimately, the effectiveness of radiological or chemical contamination for area denial is likely to be limited. Due to the psychological impact of radiological hazards among the general population, attacks and threats of attack on nuclear installations may also be used for escalatory, deterrent or coercive purposes and as a ‘half-step’ between the use of conventional weapons and a nuclear weapons attack.
Short of attacking nuclear installations as a primary
target of a military operation, militaries may also encounter and need to contest nuclear facilities on an axis of advance during a land invasion or may be required to carry out air campaigns against territory where nuclear sites are present. Militaries – supported by relevant national authorities – must therefore ensure they have the necessary expertise and capabilities and have conducted the necessary operational planning to be able to safely operate around nuclear facilities if this becomes necessary.
Mitigating risks from conflict Given the various operational and strategic drivers for the use of military force against nuclear installations, the paper argues that a number of considerations become prevalent in managing and mitigating related nuclear safety risks.
These include:
● Strengthening understanding of, and compliance with, existing international legal principles and norms that restrict the use of military force against and near nuclear installations. This is a key measure to reduce risks. It may include developing additional guidance on the operationalisation of existing legal provisions and considering how legitimate military objectives may be pursued while maintaining maximum respect for nuclear safety. These may be developed by individual governments or groups of governments, or by international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Ensuring that these principles and their operationalisation are understood and respected at all ranks of a military force is also critical. Clear demonstrations of political commitments to existing restrictions and norms relating to attacks against nuclear facilities should be pursued. There are instances when military force may be used against, or in the vicinity of, nuclear installations for the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.
www.neimagazine.com | June 2025 | 21
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47
