USCG PHOTO BY CHRISTOPHER EVANSON


Coast and unleashing mass flooding in the greater New Orleans area. In A Failure of Initiative, the 2006 federal after-action


report by the US House of Representatives that examined the response to Hurricane Katrina, both the National Weather Service and the National Hurricane Center received praise for their forecast efforts. Storm track projections were avail- able nearly 56 hours before Katrina’s arrival, with the landfall prediction off by a mere 15 miles. In its preparations for Katrina’s arrival, the USCG issued


broadcasts to mariners—repeated radio warnings to the offshore recreational and commercial fishing communities— and pre-positioned key rescue assets to safe areas ahead of the storm, thereby ensuring airframe survivability and promoting a rapid response posture as soon as the weather conditions permitted. Despite all early warnings and preparations—and as it


remains today with economically challenged communities where seasonal natural disasters are common—thousands of New Orleanians were simply unable to evacuate ahead of the storm. But Katrina wasn’t just a storm. Te extreme rain, surging waters, and high winds stressed the city’s extensive flood protection system to the breaking point. According to published reports, once the 17th Street Canal


levee gave way, just after 9 am the morning of landfall, New Orleans began to flood. One disaster was followed by 28 addi- tional catastrophes as levee after levee burst, releasing billions of gallons of water into the city over the next 24 hours, and turning an already severe hurricane into a disaster of epic proportions. Nearly 80% of all structures in Orleans Parish sustained water damage, with more than 204,000 homes damaged or destroyed, and an estimated 800,000 citizens in the greater New Orleans metropolitan area forced from their homes—the largest displacement of Americans since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. To make matters worse, the primary and secondary power


sources for the city of New Orleans—including the pumping stations that might have prevented some of the flooding— were down, as was the local communications infrastructure, making it difficult for state and local responders to effectively evaluate the unfolding disaster, let alone coordinate their actions. Instead, initial communications between responders consisted of limited cell phone availability and satellite phones.


The Coast Guard Launches Mere hours after Katrina made landfall in Louisiana on Aug. 29, once the winds of the storm had dropped to just below 60 knots, USCG helicopter crews launched their rescue operations. Te first happened at around 2:50 that afternoon; they continued long into the night. Te Coast Guard Aviation Training Center (ATC) in


2020 Q4 ROTOR 27


Mobile, Alabama, and Coast Guard Air Station New Orleans (the buildings of which suffered considerable damage during the storm) shared tactical control for operations. Helicopter rescue crews from USCG air stations across the country would receive tasking from ATC Mobile. After flying sched- uled six-hour mission windows, crews would return to ATC Mobile for mission debriefing. Tey’d be replaced by rested, briefed, and newly tasked crews who would launch imme- diately for the flooded New Orleans area while the original crew ate and tried to get a few precious hours of sleep. Berthing was sparse, and commodities were few. Crews


slept on cots on the floor of an administration building with no air-conditioning, their limited electricity provided by an auxiliary generator. For the first week, they subsisted on bottled water and MREs (Meals, Ready-to-Eat) flown in by


One-third of all USCG aviation assets were deployed to the Gulf Coast for Katrina relief. Below, a crew from Kodiak, Alaska, based out of Air Station Houston, aboard an HH-60 Jayhawk out of Air Station Clearwater, Florida, drops a sandbag to repair a damaged levee.


Opposite, USCG Petty Officer 2nd Class Shawn Beaty looks for survivors.


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