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“ “


An accident changes your level of vigilance. So I always have a place I’m going in the


event of a partial power or engine failure plus an alternate … and an alternate … and an alternate— just a heightened sense of awareness I thought I had but really didn’t before the accident.”


I can recall when I used to fly medevac for the state police. I’d often put pressure on


myself to try to complete the missions. After an encounter with IIMC or flying in bad weather too often, I decided I needed to take a more conservative approach. I didn’t make a drastic change but enough to keep me and my crew safe for the 18 years I flew for the police. Now, I fly corporate, I rely on a good FRAT, good training, good CRM, and good decision- making. The great equipment helps as well.”





Numerous situations over the years during single-pilot operations in which I was surprised by something unexpected have convinced me that having nonrated crew members who aren’t actively engaged in the flight safety equation results in significantly increased operational risk. An actively engaged team of nonrated crew members working with a single pilot can close safety gaps.”


“ “


After experiencing a dynamic rollover accident because the snow skis were improperly modified, I now (1) always check the mechanic’s work; (2) try to self-check my assumption bias that if someone else has been operating the aircraft in that condition for a period of time, then everything is OK; and (3) use caution when I put something on the MEL that I think won’t be important.”


While flying on the coast of Alaska in the spring, I encountered a snowstorm in a VFR machine.


A series of external pressures had led me to make a go decision, but had I taken more time for preflight planning and not allowed myself to rush, I would have most likely chosen not to go. Now, when the customer’s in a hurry, I tend to intentionally drag my feet. I revert to what I learned in flight school: I use the PAVE model to ensure that I’ve checked every box and I’m making a safe go/no-go decision. This intentional dragging of my feet has really led me to evaluate opportunities for outs. That Alaska flight was the worst flight I’ve ever had, but I think I’m better for it now. Mission creep sneaks up on you when you least expect it. I hope to never let it happen again.”


COURTESY CHAD DOLLICK


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