AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS
(MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT 1976 NOT BEING ENFORCED
2. At the same time, the authorities - well aware that, if the threat proves unfounded, the citizens grumble at the inconvenience they were put to - protect their other flank by signalling in advance their sober, Solomonic judiciousness in putting the safety of the public before all else.
This is the exact reason that s75 was included and titled as a saving clause, it was to ensure with foresight that the industry kept its localism and vehicles, and drivers did not work anywhere in the country, all day every day.
It could be argued that they did in fact take into consideration the remote threat in advancement of technology and how this could erode the localism of the 76 Act while jointly acknowledging that an odd occurrence would not contribute to an epidemic.
There are three main rules to interpret a statute, those being the literal, golden and mischief rule and the integrated approach, known as the purposive approach.
• The literal rule: uses the plain ordinary meaning of words. In Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731 the defendant, a shopkeeper, displayed in his window a flick knife with a price ticket, and was prosecuted for “offering for sale” an offensive weapon contrary to the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The High Court said the phrase “offer for sale” was to be taken literally, in accordance with its meaning in contract law, and that the shop- keeper’s display of the weapon was no more than an invitation to treat. It was presumed that Parliamentary draftsmen know technical legal language thus common law expression was not altered.
• The golden rule: is an extension of the literal rule and has both a
MAY 2022
narrow and wider application and is used where the literal rule creates an absurdity. This is evident in the narrow sense in Adler v George [1964] All ER 628. Adler gained access to a RAF station and obstructed a member of Her Majesty’s forces engaged in security duties ‘in the vicinity of a prohibited place’. He argued that, as he was actually in the prohibited place, he could not be said to be “in the vicinity” of the prohibited place. The literal interpretation of the Official Secrets Act 1920 would allow protesters to demonstrate within military bases but not outside them, creating an absurdity. This was clearly not the intention of this Act. Adler was found guilty of the offence because “in the vicinity of” should be interpreted to mean on or near the prohibited place.
• The mischief rule: allows judges slightly more discretion. It looks at the gap or the mischief the statute was intended to cover. In the case of Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102, the Licensing Act 1872 stipulated that it was an offence to be drunk in charge of a carriage. Whilst no direct reference was made to bicycles, the court ruled that Corkery was guilty as the term “carriage” could also be applied to a bicycle.
• The purposive approach: is used by most European countries when inter- preting their own legislation and by the European Court of Justice in interpreting European Union law and is becoming increasingly influential. In Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997) IRLR 168 CA, the complainant suffered racial abuse at work, which he claimed amounted to racial discrimination for which the employers were liable under s32 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The Court of Appeal applied the purposive approach and held that the acts of discrimina- tion were committed “in the course of employment” is to be given an everyday, rather than a tort law, meaning.
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