USCG RAISES AWARENESS ON TOWING VESSEL’S UNSAFE CONDITION
The US Coast Guard has published Findings of Concern 009-19, entitled Corrosion Caused Casualties. The purpose of this release is to bring awareness to unsafe conditions discovered during 2018 on a Louisiana towing vessel during a marine casualty investigation.
On September 25, 2018, an Inspected Towing Vessel (ITV), pushing a loaded tank barge, experienced a loss of steering and ran aground.
The marine casualty investigation decided the initiating event to the incident to be the port shaft propeller nut that was wedged into the rudder, which obstructed the free and full movement of the steering gear.
Probable cause The investigation concluded that the initiating event causal factors were: – A material failure of the port shaft propeller nuts locking strap (missing); – Lack of a secondary securing mechanism (second nut/cotter pin) on the port propeller nut; – Inadequate corrosion mitigation preventative maintenance program.
In addition, visual analysis of the starboard shaft locking strap highlighted significant deterioration of the locking mechanism, which needed immediate replacement.
According to the analysis of this incident Marine Inspectors inspected the locking nuts straps of various ITV’s during scheduled dry-dock exams which indicated similar corrosion issues.
LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND POOR MAINTENANCE LED TO FATALITY
Ireland’s Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) has published an investigation report on a fatal incident involving the fishing vessel ‘Aisling Patrick’ 15 nm off Broadhaven, Co Mayo, on 10th April 2018. The accident resulted in one fatality. The report highlighted poor training and maintenance, as well as an inefficient EPIRB.
On the 10th April, 2018 at approximately 07.00 hrs, the ‘FV Aisling Patrick’ departed from Ballyglass, Co. Mayo, with three persons on board to fish for mackerel between Erris Head and Eagle Island. Around 12.30 hrs the vessel began listing to starboard. The Skipper entered the wheelhouse and the speed was reduced to ascertain the cause of the list. A wave struck the vessel on the port quarter which pushed the starboard bulwark under water and flooded the deck. Almost immediately a second wave struck the port side again and capsized the vessel.
The Skipper had commenced a mayday message after the first wave struck, but he had not completed it when the second wave struck and capsized the vessel. He swam out from underneath the capsized vessel. The other two crew members were thrown into the water. The liferaft surfaced from under the vessel and one crew member inflated it and climbed aboard. He threw a large fender towards the Skipper. The third crew member was in the water face down and did not make any attempt to swim or stay afloat. One crew member was in the liferaft, the other two were in the water drifting away.
Conclusions - There were at least two possible sources of water ingress identified on the starboard side of the vessel. One source identified was the multiple pipe connections between the oil cooler and deck water pump. Another source of water ingress was through a crack in the deck leading to the aft starboard compartment.
- The bilge alarm systems did not give an early warning of water ingress into either compartment. This indicates that the vessel had not been maintained to the requirements of the CoP as required in the CoP Section.
- The requirements set out in Sections 2.17, 2.18 and 4.3.2 and Annex 7 of the CoP could benefit from elaboration to assist owners in ensuring the installation and maintenance of effective bilge pump arrangements.
– The most probable reason the EPIRB did not deploy is that its hydrostatic release did not immerse to four metres. - The distress message would have been complete had it been sent digitally by activating the DSC button on the VHF. - The absence of any formal operational training for the crew of this vessel resulted in poor operational procedures and incorrect actions during an emergency situation.
Read the report in full at:
https://bit.ly/2J5Baws.
22 | The Report • September 2019 • Issue 89
Safety Briefings
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