MAIB REPORT INTO THE FATAL SINKING OF NANCY GLEN RECOMMENDS A REGULAR REVIEW OF SMALL FISHING VESSELS’ STABILITY
At about 1750 on 18 January 2018, the prawn trawler Nancy Glen (TT100) capsized and later sank in Lower Loch Fyne, Scotland.
Weather conditions were benign, and rescuers were quickly at the scene; however, only one of the three crew survived.
Nancy Glen was trawling at the time of the accident and the combined effect of a turn to starboard at the same time as the starboard net filling with mud caused the vessel to rapidly heel to starboard, then capsize. Through life modifications to the vessel had reduced its stability, increasing its vulnerability to capsize.
Realising the seriousness of the situation, one crewman dashed to escape. However, the darkness, disorientation, rapid nature of the capsize event and inrush of water to the wheelhouse will have denied the other two crew members the opportunity to escape.
Safety lessons It is critical that fishing vessels have sufficient stability to meet their operating profile. Nancy Glen’s stability was insufficient to overcome the circumstances of a net digging into the seabed concurrently with the vessel turning.
Recent modifications to Nancy Glen had a detrimental effect on the vessel’s stability but no checks had been carried out to assess the effect on stability.
Although voluntary guidance was available, there was no mandatory requirement for owners of small fishing vessels to carry out stability assessments.
Read the story in full at
https://bit.ly/2ZKMvHK or download the report at
https://bit.ly/2NsdV3K.
TIGER ONE REPORT BY MAIB SAYS IMPACT OF COLLISION LESSENED BY THE USE OF A KILL CORD AND ROBUST CONSTRUCTION
The MAIB has published its report into the incident on the River Thames involving Tiger One. At 1738 on 17 January 2019, the commercially operated rigid inflatable boat Tiger One hit a mooring buoy on the River Thames in London, England, at a speed of about 26 knots in darkness. Two passengers and the boat’s two crew were taken to hospital with minor injuries. Tiger One was severely damaged.
Tiger One was one of two 12m RIBs owned and operated by 88 London Ltd that were used to provide sightseeing tours and charters on the River Thames. Tiger One was certified by the Port of London Authority (PLA) and permitted to navigate up to a maximum speed of 30 knots. The RIBs were purpose-built in 2008 by Ribcraft for personnel transport operations off Tunisia, but had been purchased and returned to the UK in 2017. The hulls were glass reinforced plastic fitted with ‘puncture-proof’ sponsons, and propulsion was via two 275hp inboard diesel engines with stern drives.
About the incident The skipper did not see the mooring buoy in time to take avoiding action. The buoy’s light was possibly difficult to see against the back scatter of shore lights and might also have been obscured to some degree by birds. The skipper had limited experience of commercial passages in darkness in the area. He was navigating solely by eye and had either thought that Tiger One was closer to the centre of the navigable channel, or had forgotten that the buoy was there.
More serious consequences resulting from the collision were prevented by Tiger One’s robust construction, seating arrangements, and the skipper’s use of a kill cord. However, the circumstances of the collision indicate that there is significant potential for more serious consequences to result from similar high-speed accidents in the future.
Download the report at
https://bit.ly/2y45YaN.
The Report • September 2019 • Issue 89 | 21
Safety Briefings
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