The STCW regulatory, training-safety model, has a natural cause and effect output, namely;


• More technology ... which requires


• Fewer crew ... who receive


• Poorly regulated training (That is wide open to loose


interpretation by different States) ... and who are, therefore


• Cheaper and Less professional ... arguable resulting in


• Less Accidents? (because the machines do the thinking) ... offering


• Greater profits? }


Seafaring is and always has been a vocation, but it eventually evolved into a profession. Inshore, coastal, and river transport took men and women into a natural world of adventure where the wide expanses of water were looked at as somewhere to be explored. No mountains or visible terrain just vast expanses of nothing - what was over the horizon?


So, the human interface has always been at the forefront of maritime, the link between the sailor, the ship and the forces of nature.


Consistently shown to be Incorrect at every level - therefore false economy


The simple reality is this model has consistently been proven not to work. Yet, within the maritime industry, where STCW was adopted around 1978, it has been supported by a regulatory framework which has driven training and competency standards towards the lowest common denominator using the arbitrary (and clearly unsupported) arguments that all maritime training is equal and all seafarers are trained to the same standard - (which they are not).


Anyone who has undertaken BRM training will (or should) have realised from the cultural research models developed by Geert Hofstede (1984) that not all nationalities will respond to training, assume responsibility or take to command authority in the same way.


So how do we see the future?


Knowledge of the ship and its interaction with the forces of nature was a fundamental aspect of shipping until the advent of the powered vessel. Steam power gave the ship and its crew some control over the forces of nature, they were not ruled by them. That ability has developed exponentially, especially over the last 30 years or so. The coming of the computer and its ability to control many of the navigational and engineering functions, was seen by the ship owners and managers as mana from heaven. Fill the ship with gadgetry


and there will be no need for crew!


Things have not actually worked out that way; aids to navigation such as ECDIS which should have prevented collisions and groundings have not. They still occur, so we must question why? Is it because the technology itself is at fault, is there an over reliance on such technology, or is it that the personnel using it are inexperienced or not trained correctly in its operation?


There most probably are elements The Report • March 2020 • Issue 91 | 45


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