Contributing to the extent of the fire damage was the substantial use of combustible wood paneling and drapery throughout the accommodation spaces. This allowed the fire to rapidly expand, consuming the superstructure and the accommodation spaces below the main deck.
The fire damage caused the vessel to lose electrical power and then the fire pumps supplying the water hoses shortly after the crew began fighting the fire. The crew attempted to reach the fire extinguishers, but they were inaccessible due to the intense heat. Since there were no other accessible fire pumps aboard, the crew was unable to effectively fight the fire and was forced to retreat to the stern of the vessel.
NEW JOINT INDUSTRY REPORT GIVES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED BATTERY SAFETY ON VESSELS
In collaboration with the Norwegian, Danish and US maritime authorities, battery manufacturers, system integrators, suppliers of fire extinguishing systems, shipyards and shipowners, DNV GL has released a new report on battery safety in ships. The report assesses explosion and fire risks in maritime battery installations and the effectiveness of fire extinguishing systems in the event of a battery fire.
“Batteries onboard ships are both environmentally friendly and cost-effective solutions that we wish to see more of in the future. This project has been important in learning the risks of these systems and using the new insight to improve safety requirements,” says Lars Alvestad, Acting Director of the Norwegian Maritime Authority.
A battery fire can produce very hot fires, as well as the risk of explosion due to gases produced by the battery. DNV GL’s new report presents the results of research on what happens during a fire in a battery compartment, the release of gases, and the usefulness of various extinguishing systems in combatting the fire and preventing explosions. One of the most important findings concerns ventilation systems, which are critical to avoiding an accumulation of explosive gas. The report concludes that ventilation alone will not adequately mitigate gas accumulation if a significant portion of the battery system ignites.
“In addition to fire suppression and ventilation, the battery design must have preventative safety barriers so that the fire and gas emissions are limited to as small a part of the battery system as possible,” says Henrik Helgesen, Project Manager for the research project and Senior Consultant at DNV GL.
Read the report in full at
https://bit.ly/2Rwto2R
MOB RECOVERY EQUIPMENT AND DRILLS INSPECTIONS TO BE WITNESSED BY MCA SURVEYORS FOLLOWING MAIB REPORT
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has published its report on the investigation into an accident where a tug’s chief engineer lost his life boarding his vessel. The MCA has instructed its surveyors to witness inspections of MOB recovery equipment and drills following the MAIB report.
The tug was carrying out typical shiphandling and standby duties at a UK oilterminal, on this occasion involving changing its standby berth due to inclement weather. While sailing, the tug’s chief engineer went ashore to release the mooring lines but fell through the gap between the fender and the oil stage while attempting to re- board. He was wearing a full set of PPE including helmet, safety boots, hi-vis jacket and auto-inflating lifejacket with a PLB and crotch strap fastened. His lifejacket inflated automatically, and his crewmates quickly recovered him alongside the tug, they were unable to lift him from the water however as he become incapacitated in the cold water and lost consciousness.
He was recovered by a local rescue boat and despite its crew’s efforts applying CPR and being transferred to hospital the chief engineer suffered cold water shock followed by cardiac arrest from which he did not recover.
MAIB examined in detail the difficulties recovering persons from the water including use of rescue slings and davits, also Jason’s Cradles which the tug in question was equipped with. It is worth noting that despite the tug having a crew of four (including the chief engineer) they faced enormous challenges in attempting to recover him.
Following the accident the MCA has issued instructions to its surveyors to ensure inspections of MOB recovery equipment and drills are witnessed at biennial inspections.
The Report • March 2020 • Issue 91 | 17
Safety Briefings
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