minimising road traffic accidents were therefore huge benefits of this project. From January to October 2020, nearly 12,100 road traffic accidents were recorded in Ghana, involving 20,400 vehicles. Statistics from the National Road Safety Authority and The Accident Network Law Group indicate that road traffic accidents cost the West African nation 1.6% of GDP annually, which translates into about US$165m. In addition, the Master Plan noted that modelled impacts of road use emissions were estimated to contribute more than US$2m in emissions-related costs by 2027, and around US$47m by 2036.
About the project A key part of this particular development is the stretch of rail from Takoradi Port up into the Huni Valley – a 102km track forming a core element of the wider Western Line development running from the port to Kumasi, with a branch route into Awaso. It is designed to carry both freight and passenger services up to maximum speeds of 120km/h. Commenting on the project, Ken Ofori-
Atta, Minister of Finance for the Republic of Ghana, said: “This project is part of Ghana’s railway infrastructure plan and has been earmarked for implementation by government and will be the single biggest railway investment by the country, post- independence. The Western Line is key to the haulage of agricultural produce and minerals from the Middle Belt to Takoradi Port in the south of Ghana. The corridor is home to key bauxite mines, which are the bedrock of the country’s Integrated Bauxite Aluminium Masterplan. The completion of the line will boost economic activities along the corridor, and will reduce cost and time of transporting goods and passengers between the two ends.” The project includes the upgrade of the
existing railway infrastructure between Takoradi Port and Huni Valley, allowing for standard gauge rail lines to be installed, and some realignments, so that trains can run faster and more safely.
In June 2020, a commercial agreement
was signed between the Republic of Ghana, represented by the GRDA, and Amandi Investment Ltd, for the engineering, procurement and construction of the Takoradi Port to Huni Valley section of the Western Line. Once the railway is completed and trains are running, the GRDA will take over responsibility for operating the railway.
Sourcing the finance While the Ghanaian government had financed other parts of the new railway
44
Figure 1: The Ghana Railway Master Plan Hamile BURKINA FASO Nalerigu Wa Paga Bolgatanga BENIN
Damongo
Tamale
Sheini
COTE D’IVOIRE
Dambai TOGO Sunyani Techiman Kumasi Goaso Ho Sefwi-Wiawso Elubo Cape Coast
Sekondi- Takoradi
Koforidua Accra Aflao
Phase 1: 2022 Phase 2: 2027 Phase 3: 2033 Phase 4: 2036
Source: Review of Railway Master Plan of Ghana (2013), Ghana Railway Development Authority Kwadwokurom
network, it could not finance all of it, despite being a trusted Eurobond issuer. Bluebird Finance & Projects Ltd, a financial services firm based in Israel and Europe which specialises in putting together large-scale infrastructure projects in developing economies, was brought in by Amandi to look at financing sources from leading international banks, export credit agencies and the insurance sector, since Ghana’s Ministry of Finance is a significant user of ECA finance. Deutsche Bank and Investec, with the support of Bluebird, structured and arranged the corresponding financing. To comply with Ghana’s national regulations, an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) was undertaken for the entire Western Line project in 2015, on behalf of the GRDA. Gaining access to international finance also requires an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report (ESIA), which identifies the potential for significant environmental and social impact and, in the words of the ESIA framework, finds solutions to “mitigate, avoid and reduce any potentially harmful effects during the lifecycle of the project”. Mindful that any form of development will always have an impact on the environment and society, the assessment ensured that complete cancellation of the project remained an option. In other words, would the potential negative impacts of
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92
