MY 2 CENTS By Randy Rowles
THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT HELICOPTERS ARE THRIVING:
Helicopter manufacturers continue to post strong sales across multiple sectors. Emergency medical services, public safety, military training, offshore energy, utility operations, and corporate transport all rely on rotorcraft to solve problems that no other platform can. Yet while helicopter sales remain steady, the infrastructure required to operate them safely and efficiently is steadily disappearing. Across the United States, heliports, vertiports and established transition routes are being closed, restricted or sidelined, often under the stated justification of safety. In practice, noise complaints, land value, redevelopment pressure, and institutional risk aversion frequently play a far larger role.
This growing disconnect between helicopter demand and helicopter access presents a fundamental policy challenge. Helicopters are only as safe and effective as the infrastructure that supports them. When that infrastructure erodes, risk does not disappear—it simply migrates elsewhere.
A clear example is the ongoing effort to close the Indianapolis Downtown Heliport. Located on valuable urban land, the heliport has served emergency medical operators and business aviation for years. In late 2025, the Indianapolis Airport Authority moved to permanently close the facility and release it from federal aviation obligations, citing declining use and operating costs. Yet, the underlying reality is difficult to ignore. The property sits on valuable downtown land that’s increasingly attractive for redevelopment.
Aviation stakeholders have raised legitimate concerns that the loss of the heliport will degrade emergency response capability and permanently remove helicopter access to the city center. Once a heliport in a dense urban environment is lost, it is rarely replaced. Safety arguments, while formally stated, struggle to overcome the perception that land value and development opportunity are the true drivers.
Dallas offers another cautionary example. The Dallas Central Business District Vertiport, adjacent to the convention center, served helicopters for decades that supported law enforcement, charter
operations, training, aerial survey, and corporate
transport. In 2025, the facility was closed to make way for redevelopment tied to the convention center expansion. City leaders offered assurances that a new vertiport would be
10 Jan/Feb 2026
constructed in the future, with language emphasizing eVTOL readiness.
What was missing from those assurances was clarity for helicopter operators. Longhorn Helicopters, which successfully operated from the Dallas vertiport, was unable to obtain confirmation that helicopter access would be preserved when the facility is eventually rebuilt. The vertiport may return, but the aircraft that relied on it today were effectively displaced in favor of an aspirational future industry that has yet to demonstrate scalable, real-world operations.
More subtle, but equally impactful, is the loss of airspace infrastructure. At Dallas Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), helicopters historically relied on a north-south spine route running through the center of the airport between the east and west runway complexes. This route existed for decades and was specifically designed to segregate helicopter traffic from high- speed airline operations. It reduced pilot workload, improved predictability, and enhanced safety for all users of the airspace. It also had no history of contributing to mid-air conflicts.
Following the mid-air collision near Washington National Airport, a wave of reactive policy decisions followed nationwide. At DFW, this resulted in the restriction and effective closure of the helicopter spine route. The change was not caused by a newly identified helicopter hazard. It was driven by air traffic control staffing limitations and heightened institutional risk aversion in the aftermath of an unrelated accident.
This distinction matters. The spine route did not become unsafe overnight. The system simply lost the capacity to manage complexity. Helicopters were forced into longer, less efficient routes that increased workload and reduced predictability. A safety tool was removed not because it failed, but because the system supporting it became constrained.
The continued loss of helicopter infrastructure produces second-order effects that often go unacknowledged. When designated heliports and landing zones are routinely used, they are maintained, inspected, and familiar to operators. When access is restricted or eliminated, those same areas deteriorate. Over time, pilots are forced to seek alternatives, sometimes in jurisdictions with restrictive landing policies or ambiguous
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