FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF THE M/V CHESHIRE REPORT, A RECOMMENDATION IS MADE THAT AMMONIUM NITRATE SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS GROUP C
Following the investigation report of the 2012 built supramax bulk carrier M/V CHESHIRE which was issued by the Isle of Man Ship Registry, INTERCARGO urges IMO to reconsider how Ammonium Nitrate Based Fertilizer should be designated in the IMSBC Code. Currently, the Ammonium Nitrate Based Fertilizer is listed as a group C cargo, however, the accident showed that this cargo, or at least some of the ammonium nitrate based fertilizers shipped as this cargo, should treated differently under the IMSBC Code.
In August 2017, the 2012 built supramax bulk carrier M/V CHESHIRE, en route from Norway to Thailand, fully loaded with cargo declared by the shipper as being “Ammonium Nitrate Based Fertilizer (Non-hazardous)” and not liable to self-sustaining decomposition, suffered cargo decomposition that led to rising temperatures in the cargo holds and the generation of toxic gases.
The decomposition progressed throughout the length of the vessel to such an extent that, after several days, the vessel’s Master took the decision to evacuate the crew. The vessel was then left to drift under the supervision of the Spanish Authorities until being salvaged, but in the end, due to extensive damage, the vessel was declared a constructive total loss.
Recommendations - The report makes some important recommendations including:
– Amending the misleading cargo name from “Ammonium Nitrate Based Fertilizer (non-hazardous)” to “Ammonium Nitrate Based Fertilizer (not otherwise classified)”;
– The fertilizer manufacturers to provide further information on the behaviour and carriage of this cargo; and consideration of whether the current IMO-stipulated test for assessment of self-sustaining decomposition properties of an ammonium nitrate based fertilizer is adequate.
– The provision of specialist equipment onboard the vessel, monitoring of the cargo atmosphere by the crew, and the development of cargo and ship specific procedures related to the carriage of this cargo.
Read the story in full and download the report at
https://bit.ly/2P4bVi3
SAFETY WARNING ABOUT WORKING IN ENCLOSED SPACES AFTER THE LOSS OF LIFE ON A FISHING VESSEL ISSUED BY MAIB
This urgent bulletin has been issued after working in a refrigerated saltwater tank resulted in a fatal accident on board fv Sunbeam (FR487) at Fraserburgh, Scotland.
Initial findings At about 0900 on 14 August, Sunbeam’s crew arrived at the vessel’s berth ready to begin work. The vessel’s refrigeration plant had been shut down after landing the final catch at Lerwick, and its RSW tanks had been pumped out and tank lids opened in preparation for deep cleaning. At some time between 1200 and 1350, Sunbeam’s second engineer entered the aft centre RSW tank and collapsed.
At about 1350, the second engineer was seen lying unconscious at the aft end of the tank by a crewmate, who immediately raised the alarm. Three of the vessel’s crew entered the tank and tried to resuscitate the second engineer but they soon became dizzy, confused and short of breath. One of the crew managed to climb out of the tank unaided, the other two crewmen and the second engineer were recovered onto the open deck by two crewmen wearing breathing apparatus. The two crewmen made a full recovery, but the second engineer could not be resuscitated and died.
It is unclear when and why the second engineer entered the tank. However, evidence indicated that his intention was to sweep the residual seawater that had settled at the aft end of the tank forward into the tank’s bilge well. No safety procedures for entering or working in RSW tanks had been completed before he entered the tank.
Read the story in full and download the safety bulletin at
https://bit.ly/2R2U2NY
16 | The Report • December 2018 • Issue 86
Safety Briefings
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