EDITORIAL COMMENT


Forewarned is forearmed


The January 2013 hostage siege at In Anemas serves as a grim reminder that oil and gas facilities, both on land and offshore, are viable targets for terrorists (Credit: BP)


F


ew readers can have failed to feel a familiar sense of horror as the hostage siege at the In Anemas gas


plant in Algeria played out across media networks, before descending into carnage in January 2013. When an Islamist group claimed responsibility for the attack on the BP facility, which is responsible for more than 10% of Algeria’s gas output, it served as a depressing reminder that the oil and gas sector remains one of the most vital, visible – and, ergo, viable – targets for terrorists, wielding, as it does, the power to make or break national GDPs. It could be argued that, as a result of


working in environments where marine piracy is commonplace, the offshore oil and gas segment is all too aware of the potential threat posed to its floating assets and platforms. Areas such as the coast of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea have been blighted by pirate attacks in recent years; as our security focus in Offshore Marine Technology Q3 2012 (pp10-12) highlighted, attacks are disturbingly commonplace in Nigerian waters, and, of 60 incidents logged in this region between 1975 and 2010, virtually every single one led to temporary shutdown of the targeted facility. And, lest we forget, these stats account for recorded incidents alone – given that as many as 50-80% of pirate attacks are reckoned to go unrecorded, we are dealing with extremely conserva- tive estimates. However, terrorists are not necessarily


concerned with the average pirate’s game plan of securing a heſty sum to escape a lifetime of poverty, and the willingness of many extremists to ‘die for the cause’ ups the stakes considerably. It is important not to confuse the aims and strategies


of pirates and terrorists, and offshore risk assessment should take account of the differences between opportunistic attempts at crime and carefully planned missions to cause the maximum amount of damage, and fatalities, possible. Te fallout of the attack on In Anemas


has liſted the lid on some more complex issues, which, disturbing as they are to contemplate, should nonetheless be addressed by the offshore industry. Firstly, offshore installations make a perfect target for terrorists, and are likely to feature heavily in future attacks. Causing vital damage to floating and fixed offshore oil and gas facilities also increases the risk of pollution in surrounding waters and, in the event of a particularly heavy attack, could easily see whole fields of production shut off for months, if not years. One need only consider the impact of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident for a hint of the scale of disruption that can be caused; while activity in the Gulf of Mexico was effectively paralysed by the drilling moratorium that followed, the knock-on effect on maritime and offshore service providers in the southern states was equally devastating. Additionally, at time of going to press,


the death toll among the international hostages at In Anemas was reported to stand at the 48 mark. In contrast, a large number of the plant’s workers were leſt unharmed and, subsequently, able to flee the facility in one piece. Tis outcome suggests that the attackers were extremely well organised and capable of acting with military precision. It also strongly hints that the attackers may have received some form of ‘inside assistance’


Offshore Marine Technology 1st Quarter 2013


from workers at the plant. Pitted against this scenario, many operators are limited in what physical security precautions they can practically undertake. Psycho- metric testing has been used, in varying degrees, by the merchant shipping sector when recruiting seafarers, but even that methodology is not foolproof, and may be a poor deterrent to a determined, well-trained aggressor. While there is no easy, single solution when it comes to preventing internal sabotage or staff cooperation with terrorists, risk assess- ment plans could perhaps also cover the relationships between the oil and gas companies and the locals in the territories in which they operate. Technology and satcomms have


obvious roles to play in defending offshore facilities, but the industry needs to also go further; to use incidents such as the In Anemas siege, as horrific as it was, as opportunities for learning, and for getting into the terrorists’ mind sets. Te question of whether or not offshore assets might be attacked is largely redundant; better questions to ask would include, has your organisation done all it possibly can to forestall an attack? And, should an attack occur, can you get your personnel to a place of safety without incurring fatalities, nor inflict- ing damage upon the environment? Reluctance to face up to such concerns, especially when set against increasingly volatile political and economic world circumstances, is not just ill-advised, but seriously negligent. We should not have to wait until the offshore industry faces its own In Anemas to start pondering the importance of vulnerability plans and security assessments. OMT


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