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PLANT MANAGEMENT


Chris Flower analyses the latest data on process safety in engineering design


I


f you ask any responsible company what its priorities are, safety will always be at the top. You would therefore expect that reviewing major projects from a process safety


perspective would yield little in the way   I expect a sceptical response to this last statement as most engineers’   feelings or perceptions, so I will provide some data from a series of projects undertaken with some thoughts of why mistakes occur and how they can be reduced.


ABB has undertaken 22 projects over


 safety in the design of new builds,  projects at FEED and Detailed Design, and existing process plants. Each project


SAFERDESIGN by


looked at various aspects of the design from philosophies through relief and blowdown design, high pressure/low pressure interfaces (HP/LP) to ESD, LOPA and HAZOPs. Although each of these studies found and addressed  project level, an interesting question was raised. Why were errors being made and how can they be reduced? 


project, is to collect and analyse the      allowed prioritisation of any remedial work at project stage gates and  for the next project  varied depending on the phase of the


project, but generally the codes can be


summarised as:  Code 1: Design is demonstrably    cost/schedule impact and should  progressing.


 Code 2: Design is unsafe or potentially unsafe, or critical gaps in the safety documentation. Action needs to be taken as soon as possible.


 Code 3: Design is safe but errors are  critical gaps in the documentation. Errors to be addressed.


ABB has undertaken 22 projects  review process safety


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