Exam
OUTCOMES: ANNOYING MOWER & FIGHTING PONIES
CASE 1: The answer is (b), in favor of the trainer. In rejecting the woman’s argument and finding the act protected the trainer, the court noted that the act defined “inherent risks of equine activities” to include the propensity of an animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them; the unpredictability of the animal’s re- action to such things as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons or animals. “These specific examples cover exactly [the woman’s] case where a horse’s propensity to behave in ways which might result in injury and the unpredictability of a horse’s reaction to the sound of a riding lawn mower caused injury to [her]. Assuming for the purpose of [the motion to dismiss] that [the trainer] did what [the woman says], that is that she started a lawn mower close to where [the woman] was riding, without warning, this does not rise to the level of a ‘willful or wanton’ standard. Even if it presented an issue of negligence or even gross negligence, it has been re- peatedly affirmed that this would not meet the ‘willful or wanton’ standard. Notwithstanding [the trainer’s] statutory immunity, [the woman] assumed the risk
of injury. The doctrine of assumption of risk, read in con- junction with the act, is altered in the context of equine activities. However, whether an altered or a traditional doctrine is applied, [the woman] assumed the risk. [The woman] had actual knowledge of the danger, understood and appreciated the risk of riding a horse, and voluntarily exposed herself to such risk.” The court noted that the trainer had complied with all
the signage requirements of the Equine Activities Act. The woman’s claim was dismissed before trial.
CASE 2: The answer is (d), in favor of the owner of the po- nies. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit. The victim ap- pealed. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal. The court explained, “Here, the evidence demonstrates [the owner] warned [the victim] the ponies were going to fight before they did so.
[The owner] stepped in to stop the po-
nies from fighting, and [the victim] thereafter decided to join [the owner] to help him stop the ponies from fighting. Given the parties mutual knowledge regarding equine ac- tivity, we find [the victim has] not established [the owner’s] conduct was willful or wanton under the circumstances presented.” Relying on the Equine Immunity Statute, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court’s analysis and disposition of the case.
About the author: Krysia Carmel Nelson is an attorney from Virginia who is a nationally- recognized expert in equine law. At- torney Nelson represents horse owners, trainers, riders, breeders, equestrian facilities, farms, clubs and associations across all nationally and internationally
recognized disciplines. As a lifelong equestrian, she currently rides and competes her Hanoverian Affirmed on Appeal in the amateur hunters. She can be reached at
eqlaw@aol.com.
50 September/October 2015
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© The Book LLC 2011
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