ng the case for business security


and motor vehicles driven into crowds are advocated by terrorist agitators. In addition to regrettable casualties, public fear is to be expected, especially when crude attacks are carried out with great brutality, including beheading. The cumulative effect of more potential offenders, more unpredictable incidents and greater mitigating measures adds to the burden of the authorities to PROTECT and PREPARE.


The centre ground of guns and explosives remains a present menace with additional tactics of marauding attackers and variations in components and concealment of IEDs.


At the top end of the scale, terrorist innovation is a persistent dimension. Cyber- attack plus chemical, biological and radiological aspects remains pertinent. On 24 January 2015 an airstrike near Mosul in Iraq killed a member of ISIL whom US Central Command asserted had technical competence in the production and use of chemical weapons.


The Terrorist Agenda


The final key aspect of threat development is the expressed intention of international terrorist groups. Dire events since 2001 have underlined the wisdom of listening to and evaluating what terrorist groups actually say. There is a marked correlation between intended targets and actions and grim reality on the ground. A clear current example is the stated threat of retaliation aimed at members of the US-led coalition carrying out airstrikes in Iraq.


Terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria have expressed the ambition to strike at coalition member states and have urged supporters to take action wherever they are located, including specifying potential targets and attack methods.


UK membership of the Coalition conducting operations in Iraq (but not Syria) is based on the debate held in the House of Commons on 26 September 2014. Issues of national interest and the safety of the British people from the ISIL threat were convincingly articulated. The counter-terrorist case for membership of the Coalition is soundly based and membership is likely to be long-term.


Assessing the Response Capability


The consequences of terrorist reaction are an inevitable factor in the overall threat. The combination of extended geography (both territorial and virtual), more groups and terrorists, a broadened span of attack methods and stated terrorist intentions provides the code to understanding the


© CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – S PRING 2015


changed contemporary threat of international terrorism. This is markedly different from the threats which the UK has faced since the 1970s and business security should now reflect this unwanted fact.


Lord Evans of Weardale (formerly Director General of the UK Security Service), speaking in the House of Lords (Hansard – 13 January 2015 – Column 690), said, “When I left MI5 in 2013, I felt cautiously optimistic that we were over the worst as far as Al Qaeda and Islamist terrorist attacks in this country were concerned. It seemed to me that we were making significant progress. Regrettably, subsequent events have proved that judgement to be wrong.”


This cogent analysis from one of the UK’s most knowledgeable and experienced experts becomes even more powerful when the review of threat is extended to a review of response.


The stark conclusion is that the threat has increased and the response capability has not kept pace. This has produced a gap at a time when the threat level is “Severe” and an attack is assessed as “Highly likely”.


Reasons for the Gap


The limited ability of nations, including those directly threatened by terrorist attacks, to address threats at their geographic or virtual sources is critical. There are political, social and economic constraints. There are the risks of counter-productive consequences of direct action. This means that disruption and degradation of terrorist groups will take time and sustained multi-national commitment.


President Obama of the United States has warned, “It will take time to eradicate a cancer like ISIL. And any time we take military action, there are risks involved.” (Statement by the President on ISIL, 10 September 2014 – White House.)


The Report of the House of Commons Defence Committee published on 5 February 2015 underlines the myriad challenges in defining and implementing coalition strategy in Iraq and Syria.


The domestic resourcing requirements to address the growth of the threat are formidable. Investment in intelligence is the logical best choice, but the demand extends across PURSUE, PREVENT, PROTECT and PREPARE. For example, protective security for people and places requires intensive effort with high grade skills. Monitoring and surveillance generate comparable demands for well trained staff.


Lord Harris of Haringey, speaking in the www. c i t y s e cur i t yma ga z ine . com


House of Lords (Hansard – 13 January 2015 – Column 696), questioned whether the budgetary allocation for the Police Service was adequate for the additional demand. He also drew attention to the provision of police firearms capability.


Both the former and present Director Generals of the Security Service have underlined the pressing need to modernise properly accountable access to terrorist communications to mitigate present exploitation of dark areas. There seems little doubt that this issue is a very important reason for weakness in response without the prospect of immediate resolution.


The relationship between threat and response has been graphically described in The Economist (17 January 2015 – Page 23/24) in an article entitled “COUNTER-TERRORISM – GETTING HARDER”. The final paragraph of the article states, “The citizens of the West have grown used to the idea that their security services can protect them from the worst that might happen. Faced by a new range of threats and with counter measures apparently of rapidly declining effectiveness that may be about to change.”


The UK is extremely fortunate in having highly competent private security professionals working both within companies and for external specialist providers. The UK has an excellent tradition of corporate social responsibility in terms of business self- sufficiency, support to the public services and valued contribution to the wider safety of the community. Business representative organisations have a very constructive track record of engagement on this agenda. There is a unique range of innovative public/private initiatives such as the Cross Sector Safety & Communication Project (CSSC) and Project Griffin. There may be scope for even greater effectiveness by closer co-ordination of these elements.


The conclusion of this article is that, on the basis of analysis of the threat of international terrorism and the current response, the business case is clearly made out for a step-change for in-house corporate security and for business reinforcement of public/private security.


Sir David Venness Senior Advisor, Pilgrims Group Limited


Honorary Professor of Terrorism Studies at the University of St. Andrews.


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