Closing the gap: strengtheni
Sir David Venness presents the argument that recent developments in international terrorism, and the current response to the threats and risk posed, have strengthened the business case for corporate investment in security.
use cyber-attack capabilities, possibly by buying the services of criminal hackers, although so far they have preferred the more traditional explosives and guns.”
Cyber-attack is entirely consistent with the stated international terrorist aim of causing economic harm and loss to target interests. The private sector is particularly vulnerable to this development, which reinforces the wisdom of an holistic approach to corporate security.
The FBI Cyber Division issued a detailed advisory note to private industry in September 2014 setting out the possible reaction to on- going airstrikes against ISIL. The note highlighted potential offensive cyber terrorist and hacktivist activity. The advice was aimed at US victims, but listed examples of actual incidents in the UK.
New and Old Groups T
he presence of armed soldiers on the streets of French and Belgian cities
demonstrates changed circumstances and novel dimensions of the challenge. Business leaders will wish to consider the four key factors which have led to these changed conditions:
• The threat is growing faster than the response and has created a gap in security.
• The threat and the security gap is likely to be enduring.
• The potential impact upon business encompasses staff safety and security at home and abroad.
• The changed threat and response has wide implications for business operations and thus necessitates a more integrated and comprehensive security policy.
The opportunity for business arising from these factors is to assess the need for self- help and to sharpen the corporate security posture. This opportunity extends to the business contribution to closing the security gap in the wider community interest.
A sound beginning to the process of assessment of the need for business change is to analyse the reasons for the growing threat and to appreciate the limitations upon response.
The growing threat derives from geography, groups, expanding terrorist methodology and the stated agenda of terrorist actors. Each component is explored in more detail next.
2 © CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – S P RING 2015 Geographical Concerns
Geography, in terms of space, applies to both real locations and the virtual realms of electronic communications. Terrorists have occupied the grey spaces to develop their activities and to elude traditional counter measures. Thus, instability in Syria, Iraq and Yemen added to the existing predicament of Afghanistan and Pakistan plus parts of North, East and West African states provides a wider dimension of risk.
The Director General of the UK Security Service, Andrew Parker, emphasised the Syrian aspect in his compelling and incisive address to the Royal United Services Institute at Thames House in London on 8 January 2015. He said, “Outside Iraq and Syria, we believe that since October 2013 there have been more than 20 terrorist plots either directed or provoked by extremist groups in Syria.” He reminded his audience of events in Belgium, Canada, Australia and France. He added, “We know that terrorists in Syria harbour the same ambitions towards the UK – trying to direct attacks against our country, and exhorting extremists here to act independently.”
International terrorists have already made vigorous use of ungoverned virtual territory to incite violence, to plan, to train, to create propaganda and to communicate overtly and secretly.
Sir David Omand (Securing the State, page 72) writes, “It would seem only a matter of time before neo-jihadist terrorists acquire and
www. c i t y s e cur i t yma ga z ine . com
The importance of the thread of instability extends to the emergence of new groups and new forms of old groups. The result is a wider and deeper pool of terrorists. Thus, the significance of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its assertion of Islamic Statehood attracting volunteers from many nations. There is also the forward deployment of Al Qaeda (AQ) core to Syria and the continued activities of AQ affiliates such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Groups in North, West and East Africa, some with links to ISIL, AQ or their affiliates, add to the complexity of sources of terrorist operatives.
The overall movement of fighters from outside the country to Syria is a major factor and numerically worrisome, especially when compared to the numbers who fought in Afghanistan and went on to cause a global terrorist surge.
The implication of foreign fighters is wider than the issue of persons travelling to and from Syria. The broader consequence is the danger of greater connections between potential terrorist recruits, both in their homelands and on the move, and terrorist recruiters, trainers and technical advisers in ungoverned spaces. These connections are both real and virtual.
Terrorist Methodolgy
Another component of the growing threat is the nature of terrorist plots and attacks. Terrorist methodology is expanding from the established middle ground of guns and explosives, including suicide bombers, towards new variations at both ends of the spectrum. At the unsophisticated tier, knives
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