r ism?
The first area compared was whether there is general agreement that the terrorist threat remains strong and varied, as indicated by an increase in the number of attacks in the EU, and is this articulated in national threat assessments:
• While the global terror threat as such has not increased, the current overall threat picture appears more fragmented, dynamic and complex.
• Terrorist attacks can take place without prior intelligence, i.e. without warning.
Secondly, is there general agreement that the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is significant for the terrorist threat in the EU?:
• The political changes in the MENA region have altered conditions for terrorist groups in the region. In a number of cases, the upheaval has weakened local security institutions. This has increased the latitude for terrorist groups and new safe havens have emerged for terrorist groups to train and plan their attacks.
• There are elements which make our country the target of international terrorism: its relative closeness to unstable regions like the Sahel, where failed States are conducive to criminal actions and the spread of violent extremism; the possible radicalisation of both first- and second- generation emigrants.
Thirdly, is there general agreement that the current civil war in Syria has attracted a number of radicalised European citizens and has this also received attention in national threat assessments?:
• The rebellion in Syria has been particularly attractive to individuals resident in the West, including European nations.
© CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – AUTUMN 2013
• This has increased the risk of these individuals coming into contact with militant Islamist networks, including al-Qaida-affiliated networks.
Fourthly, whether an increased use of firearms has been observed across a variety of terrorist and extremist groups:
• The capacity to carry out terrorist attacks using easily accessible weapons, including stabbing weapons, small arms and improvised explosive devices.
The final theme explored in the TE-SAT is whether there is general agreement that the current economic conditions in the EU do not appear to have had a significantly negative impact on the overall terrorism and violent extremism picture. The theme was not uniformly reflected in national threat assessments. Many European states failed to remark on the national financial crises deeply affecting Greece, and to a lesser extent Spain and Italy, as catalysts for terrorism. Only passing mentions of some Left-Wing groups exploiting the unrest amongst the national population were made in some national terrorist threat assessments.
It would appear that the absence of any potential linkage across the board suggests that Europol’s analysis appears correct; the state of European economies does not seem to be a significant driver for violent extremism. Most groups that might seek to exploit the parlous state of European economies are not gathering any momentum.
Key deductions
The evidence above, ‘roughly cut’ from English language open-source information, may not reflect the totality of national terrorism threat analysis in the open environment; but there does appear to be a good matching of national and EU agency views. From these,
there is a shared view on terrorism across the more mature European nations and whilst this risk emphasis shifts, based on local realities, there is a developing agreement that Europol’s views are generally accepted. I am convinced that with this shared view comes shared approaches and that is the aim. There will always be national views on just how clear and present terrorist danger is, but there is a general acceptance that no one is immune from the effects of terrorism, regardless of its genesis.
It is important that security risk specialists in the UK, who are well served by the various government agencies feeding perhaps the best of the European terrorism risk pictures, take note of the other national assessments opinions, if the business ‘risk-space’ spreads beyond the British Isles. Be prepared to take a local view, it is inevitably available for most of the traditional core European nations, and, helpfully, it is invariably provided in English.
I am convinced there is developing a common view on terrorism and how it threatens national security. Generally, its presentation accords with the way transnational agencies, such as Europol, present the terrorism threat to Europe as whole. As Europol develops its reputation in the sphere of terrorist threat analysis, EU national threat assessments will inevitably seek to portray their versions of the threat groups, if only to emulate the Europol analysis presentation.
Chris Tomlinson Senior Consultant Arup Resilience, Security and Risk
www.arup.com > 13
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40