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surance should be redacted. According to the Court, failure to do so will arouse the curiosity of jurors. Hams v. Nationwide (Court of Special


Appeals, No. 1573, September Term, 2001, Filed December 23, 2002, Opin- ion by Kenney), affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Hams insured a pickup truck with Nationwide under a commercial in- surance policy.


The policy contained


liability coverage of $500,000 and unin- sured/underinsured coverage of $50,000. There was no written waiver by Hams agreeing to the difference between the li- ability and UM/UIM limits. The Hams vehicle was used for both business and personal purposes. While being driven for personal use, the Hams pickup truck was involved in a collision. The two oc- cupants of the Hams vehicle sustained injuries that exceeded the insurance cov- erage of the tortfeasor and the UIM coverage available under the pickup truck’s policy.


The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit request- ing that the Nationwide policy issued to Hams be reformed to increase the UIM coverage to equal that of the liability cov- erage. Nationwide filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the written waiver requirement contained in § 19-510 of the Insurance Article did not apply to commercial policies. The mo- tion was granted by the trial court. After reviewing the language of the statute, the legislative history and other sections of the Insurance Article, the Court of Appeals held that the written waiver requirements in § 19-510 did not apply to a commercial policy. Faulk v. Ewing (Court of Appeals, No.


39, September Term, 2001, Filed Octo- ber 10, 2002, Opinion by Harrell), reversed and remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the District Court for Talbot County. Faulk was involved in a motor vehicle collision with Ewing, who was operating a car belonging to the Easton Utilities Commission, which in turn was owned and operated by the Town of Easton. An attorney on behalf of Faulk placed The Hartford Insurance Company on written notice of a claim being made against its insured, Easton. The Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) requires that proper notice be given to the Town of Easton under Courts and Judi- cial Proceedings Article § 5-304. At the conclusion of Faulk’s case, the


Defendant moved to dismiss the case con- tending that Faulk had not provided the required notice to the Town of Easton under § 5-304. The district court denied


Fall 2003


the motion. On appeal the Circuit Court for Talbot County reversed the judgment of the district court. The Court of Appeals held that Faulk


had shown substantial compliance with the LGTCA. The court ruled that the underlying purpose of § 5-304 was satis- fied by the notice to the insurer for the local government. The court further stated that when the purpose of the no- tice requirements is fulfilled, but not necessarily in a manner technically com- pliant with all the terms of the statute, such substantial compliance satisfies the statute. Practice Advice: Heed the Court’s rec- ommendation to become familiar with the requirements of the LGTCA. Andrade v. Housein (Court of Special


Appeals, No. 751, September Term, 2001, Filed October 8, 2002, Opinion by Getty), reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for new trial. At trial, Andrade proved that while waiting to make a right turn,


he was stopped for twenty to thirty sec- onds at an intersection before he was rear-ended.


At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant successfully moved for judgment. The trial judge ruled that the mere happening of an accident is not evi- dence of negligence. The Court of Special Appeals held that the facts in this case gave rise to an unrebutted


presumption of negligence.


The rear-end collision was not disputed and therefore supported an inference or presumption of negligence. The court also held that the factfinder may reason- ably infer that the driver of a vehicle is negligent when another is injured after that driver rear-ends a vehicle that is law- fully stopped on a highway and awaiting traffic to clear before entering an inter- secting highway. Accordingly, a trial court may direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant does not attempt to rebut the presumption of negligence.


 


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   


  





      


         


          


                  


 


       


     


                   


 


          


                


Trial Reporter 7


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