Recent Motor Tort Decisions (Continued from page 5)
ther proceedings. The Sherrod automo- bile was struck in the rear by a motor vehicle operated by Achir in Maryland. The plaintiffs were residents of the Dis- trict of Columbia and were insured by a policy issued in the District. The plain- tiffs filed PIP claims and pursued a third-party action against Achir. The defendants filed a summary judg- ment motion contending that the District of Columbia Compulsory/No-Fault Mo- tor Vehicle Act, D.C Code Ann. § 31-2405(b) barred the plaintiffs from pursuing a tort claim after they elected to receive PIP benefits. The Court of Special Appeals held that, under the lex loci delicti doctrine, Maryland substantive tort law controlled and that the Act did not bar the third- party claim. The court stated that the Act was part of the District of Columbia’s sub- stantive tort law, and therefore was not applicable to this Maryland collision. Practice Advice: It is the opinion of this author that if the plaintiffs had been making UM claims, the court would have precluded same based upon the Act. Todd v. MTA (Court of Appeals, No.
61, September Term, 2002, Filed Febru- ary 14, 2003, Opinion by Battaglia), reversed summary judgment and re- manded the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings. Todd was a passenger, seated behind the rear exit door on an MTA bus when fif- teen to twenty kids entered the front of the bus. Although the juveniles verbally irritated the passengers in the front of the bus, the driver did nothing. The group of kids eventually made their way to the back of the bus where they confronted Todd. The juveniles attacked Todd for about five minutes. The bus driver con- tinued to operate the bus until he pulled over to the side of the road and hit the panic button, which summoned the po- lice.
The MTA filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the driver could not have prevented the attack be- cause Todd did not present evidence that the bus driver knew that the plaintiff was going to be attacked or was in danger of being attacked. The Court of Appeals held that the
MTA had a duty to take affirmative ac- tion to prevent Todd from the attack, to take steps to protect the plaintiff from further attack and to aid Todd. The court
discussed in detail the duty of care a com- mon carrier owes to its passengers. Hodge v. Babel (Court of Special Ap-
peals, No. 1930, September Term, 2001, Filed January 30, 2003, Opinion by Salmon), affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Hodge was injured in a motor vehicle collision caused by Babel, who admitted liability before trial. The case then pro- ceeded before the jury on the sole issue of damages. At trial, Babel walked with a cane, was unsteady, and had difficulty ris- ing from his chair. Despite objections, Babel was allowed to testify that after the occurrence he was diagnosed with mul- tiple sclerosis and, as a result, was now unemployed. After receiving a disap- pointing jury award, Hodge appealed. The Court of Appeals held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to allow Babel, as factual back- ground, to give a brief explanation of the cause of his physical condition. The court reasoned that, without an explanation, the jury could have thought that Babel’s dis- ability caused Hodge’s injuries. Practice Advice: In this opinion, the court reminds plaintiffs’ attorneys that before introducing exhibits into evidence during a jury trial, all mention of any in-
6
Trial Reporter
Fall 2003
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