Appellate Decisions (Continued from page 45)


interviewed both Mary and Valerie Will- iams. During the course of these interviews Watkins called the home and spoke to both Valerie and her mother. According to Mary Williams, she in- formed Officer Colbert that Watkins threatened to come back to the house, as well as where Watkins was calling from, information she obtained by looking at her Caller I.D. box.


In response Officer


Colbert dispatched a car to that location and called for another car to bring a cam- era. Shortly thereafter, May Williams went next door to pick up her grandson and bring him back to the house. When she returned home she noticed that the Officer Colbert was no longer there. Valerie informed her that the officer “went out to the car.” Mary Williams went out and spoke briefly to the officer, who was sitting in his police cruiser writing a re- port. Mary Williams then returned to the house. A few minutes later, she glanced out the window and saw Watkins running up the front steps. At that same time, she noticed that Officer Colbert was no longer parked in front of the house. Watkins kicked open the door and shot both Valerie and Mary Williams before turn- ing the gun on himself. Valerie Williams was killed as a result of the gunshot wounds. In November 1996, Mary Williams filed a Complaint against the State of Maryland, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and Officer Colbert alleg- ing 1) that Officer Colbert had a statutory duty to protect Valerie and Mary Will- iams under Art. 27, § 11F and Baltimore City Police Department Order 10-93, and 2) that Officer Colbert, through his ac- tions and his express promise of protection, had established a “special re- lationship” with the appellants that imposed upon him a duty of protection. The Complaints against both the State of Maryland and the Mayor and City Coun- cil of Baltimore were dismissed and summary judgment was granted in favor of Officer Colbert.


Held: Affirmed. After examining the leg- islation history of § 11F, the Court held that § 11F had no bearing in this case be- cause that section only applies to the very limited situation of when a victim of do- mestic abuse requests that assistance of a police officer in accompanying her to the family home to retrieve articles of cloth- ing or other personal effects. The Court then held that because the statute did not apply under the facts of this case, and be- cause there was no evidence presented of malice, Officer Colbert was entitled to


46


public official immunity. The court also held that even assuming arguendo, that officer Colbert created a “special relation- ship” with the appellants in this case, he would still have enjoyed immunity. The Court further noted that because there was no judgment entered against Officer Colbert, the City of Baltimore could not possibly be held liable, and thus, the Com- plaint against the city was properly dismissed.


William v. Mayor, No. 672, September Term 1998, filed September 7, 1999. Opinion by Moylan, J.


________


Assault and battery – under circum- stances where defendant shot plaintiff after threatening and striking him in the head with a loaded handgun, claim of accident provides no defense.


Facts: In a private nightclub in Baltimore, Albert Carroll shot Charles A. Nelson in the stomach in the course of an alterca- tion over a debt owed to Carroll by Nelson.


Carroll, who was described in


testimony as being a “little tipsy,” entered the club and demanded repayment by Nelson of the $3,800 balance of an $8,000 loan that Carroll had made to Nelson. Nelson immediately offered to make a payment on the account but that was unsatisfactory to Carroll. Carroll had a handgun from the time he entered the nightclub. Carroll was subsequently ar- rested and charged with shooting Nelson. Carroll pled guilty to assault and illegal possession of a handgun, was convicted, and was serving a seven-year sentence at the time of the civil trial. At trial, there were only two witnesses who described how the shooting came about, Nelson and Prestley Dukes (Dukes), a witness called by Carroll. Dukes testified that when Nelson did not give Carroll his money, Carroll hit Nelson on the side of the head with the handgun and that, when Nelson did not “respond,” Carroll “went to hit him again, and when [Carroll] drawed back, the gun went off.” Nelson testified that he tendered $2,300 to Carroll, that Carroll pulled out his pistol and said that he wanted all of his money, and that the next thing that Nelson knew, he heard a shot and saw that he was bleeding. Carroll did not testify. A jury found in favor of Carroll, and the judge denied Nelson’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In a previous decision, this Court held that Nelson had properly raised his motion for judgment.


Held: Reversed. A battery occurs when one intends a harmful or offensive con-


Trial Reporter Winter 2000


tact with another without that person’s consent. The contact may be direct or indirect. Carroll unquestionably commit- ted a battery when he struck Nelson on the side of this head with his handgun. An indirect contact, such as occurs when a bullet strikes a victim, also may consti- tute a battery. Carroll’s defense that the accidentally discharged the handgun re- quires examination of the “intent” requirement for the tort of battery. It is universally understood that some form of intent is required for battery. A purely accidental touching, or one caused by mere inadvertence, is not enough to es- tablish the intent requirement for battery. The intent element of battery requires not a specific desire to bring about a certain result, but rather a general intent to un- lawfully invade another’s physical well being through a harmful or offensive con- tact or an apprehension of such a contact. Innocent conduct that accidentally or in- advertently results in a harmful or offensive contact with another will not give rise to liability, but one will be liable for such contact if it comes about as a re- sult of the actor’s volitional conduct where there is an intent to invade the other person’s legally protected interests. Even though intent is a subjective element usu- ally left for the jury’s determination, there are circumstances under which the law implies the intent element of an inten- tional tort or a crime. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the cir- cumstances of this shooting, which in essence are uncontested, is that Carroll’s actions evidenced an intent to commit a battery. Carroll presented no evidence dis- puting the fact that he carried, illegally, a loaded handgun and that he struck Nelson on the head with the gun. These facts are sufficient to infer intent to commit a bat- tery. Under the circumstances of this case, no reasonable inference could be drawn that Carroll lacked the required intent to commit the battery. Also, the uncontested facts evidence an assault from which the intent element of battery will be implied as a matter of law.


Charles A. Nelson v. Albert Carroll – No. 137, 1998 Term, decided August 26, 1999. Opinion by Chasanow, J.


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